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The United States has always proclaimed itself the land of liberty, and
scholars still usually identify its prevailing political ideas as "liberal" or at
least "liberal republican." These characterizations undoubtedly make
much sense. Americans would not have replaced English subjectship with
the particular political status they created, citizenship in a commercial re-
public guaranteeing various personal, economic, and intellectual freedoms,
if they had not been at least partly guided by the often-intertwined ideolo-
gies historians term "liberalism" and "republicanism." Yet while those
political outlooks have certainly shaped the laws that have historically
constituted American citizenship, their precepts have never been wholly
obeyed. America's civic laws have often been starkly illiberal, riddled with
racial, sexual, ideological, ethnic, and xenophobic discriminations. Today
the worst oppressions have been modified, but all the divisive tensions they
expressed remain potent forces in American politics. Most disturbingly, it
is still far from clear, even in theory, how a morally defensible body of
citizenship laws, "liberal" or otherwise, ought to respond to these forces.
In this and other writings on citizenship, I have tried to assist consider-
ation of how American civic membership should be defined in the nation's
public laws by offering analyses of how it has actually been legally de-
fined and defended historically.' For while Americans have refused to ad-
here completely to what "liberal republican" principles imply for their
civic laws, they have usually felt compelled to justify their apparent de-
partures from those principles. Their justifications provide some indica-
tion of the respects in which Americans have found traditional liberalism,
especially, lacking as a national public philosophy.
Here I wish to continue these analyses by focusing on the types of polit-
ical ideas, values, and arguments America's governors used to defend gen-
der discriminations in their citizenship laws, and to suggest why those
1. See, e.g., R.M. Smith, The "American Creed" and American Identity: The Limits of Liberal
Citizenship in the United States, 41 W. Pol. Q. 225 (1988).
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defenses were so effective in a titularly liberal polity. My central argu-
ment is that such discriminations seemed legitimate because the tradition
of liberal discourse, stemming from the opposition movements of the En-
lightenment, paid little attention to personal and communal needs for a
sense of meaningful collective identity. Thus classical liberalism said little
about what its abstract commitments to universal human rights implied
for the ways liberal societies should meet those needs.2
The failing was crucial, and not only because, as often noted, the indi-
vidualism, competitiveness, privatism, and inequalities of liberal societies
work against strong feelings of community. Even liberalism's attractive
insistence on at least a minimum of respect for all persons, inside and
outside one's political community, is in tension with a vivid belief in the
importance of one's particular civic membership, one's citizenship. Re-
peatedly, periods of substantial economic, demographic, cultural, or other
social changes fostered powerful longings for such beliefs in many Ameri-
cans. They were clearly anxious about the survival of the communal iden-
tities, including gender roles, from which they drew much of their own
senses of personhood and worth. I contend that when they found liberal
discourse largely silent about their concerns, Americans turned to discur-
sive traditions that did treat their community identity as significant-even
though these traditions often sanctified inegalitarian notions of civic roles
and social relations that permitted suppression of women (as well as racial
minorities). The language in which the nation's governors officially justi-
fied their explicit legal gender discriminations, to each other and to the
public at large, is strong evidence that they took such non-liberal notions
seriously in the efforts at collective self-definition that laws of citizenship
express.
Specifically, I will contend that from the founding until at least 1932,
America's citizenship laws were debated largely in terms of three inter-
twined but analytically distinguishable bodies of ideas or traditions of dis-
course: classical liberalism, classical republicanism, and Americanism, the
last comprised by a set of ethnocultural definitions of civic identity which
have nativism as their ultimate extreme.' Historically, these civic tradi-
tions have usually appeared in combination; none has been able to prevail
on its own. Although one could well ask why this has been so for each
tradition, my concern here is to show how liberalism's failings have often
2. This is, of course, an accusation long levelled against Enlightenment liberalism by theorists on
both the right and the left, going back at least to Burke and Rousseau. The analysis here is an
attempt to show concretely one way this liberal failing has been manifested in American law, and how
it has fostered specific invidious consequences.
3. It is noteworthy that this framework, although arrived at independently, parallels that of Hans
Kohn's classic essay American Nationalism (1957). Kohn analyzes American nationality in terms of
"three foundations": the tradition of liberty; federal republicanism; and the interaction of the predom-
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helped inegalitarian views, usually expressed in terms of the two other
traditions, to win legal enactment.4 Exponents of republican and Ameri-
canist ideas have frequently joined forces to pass laws that buttressed the
social composition and hierarchies preferred by more established citi-
zens-denials of citizenship, or conferral of second-class citizenship, on
women and minorities in ways that liberalism should logically have op-
posed. America's republican-inspired federal system, which assigns the
states powers of self-definition that they can use to enact deviations from
nationally recognized liberal rights, has also significantly aided these dis-
criminatory efforts.
As I will note in conclusion, despite real progress, recent legal develop-
ments adverse to equal rights for women suggest that modern liberalism
has still not succeeded in overcoming the long-standing appeal of these
non-liberal outlooks. New variations of traditional arguments for gender
inequalities gained great power in the 1980s, limiting or reversing liberal
egalitarian initiatives of the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the pro-
posed ERA, stricter judicial scrutiny of gender classifications, and abor-
tion rights. As feminist writers, among others, have forcefully maintained,
contemporary liberal thought still provides inadequate resources for con-
structing arguments against oppressive statuses that are sensitive both to
the social realities produced by ongoing discrimination, and to the fears
over loss of social identity that reforms produce. I will suggest that, in
confronting these disputes, liberalism's traditional commitments to equal
human rights should be preserved; but that both classical and contempo-
rary versions of liberal theory must be revised if more sustaining concep-
tions of American civic identity, for women and men, are to be achieved.'
4. See R.M. Smith, supra note 1, at 225-40, on which my discussion here draws. The three
structures of ideas on citizenship I identify are built not only from some overlapping traditions of
political argument, but also from both the English common law and the influential continental trea-
tises on international law by writers including Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel and Burlamaqui. In Ameri-
can law, the legal doctrines on citizenship derived from those juridical sources maintained some intrin-
sic content that was relatively independent of the three political traditions, including doctrines of
territorial sovereignty and birthright citizenship. These legal doctrines were, however, usually used to
justify policies spawned by one or more of those basic political perspectives.
5. These are broad claims. I will defend them here only on the basis of the justifications given in
the federal courts for legal discriminations against women, supplemented by sketches of the decisions'
broader historical context based on secondary sources. Obviously, this frame of reference is too narrow
to prove decisively any generalizations about American political and legal thought as a whole. But
precisely because, as I will discuss, the case of women seems to fit less readily into this general
framework for analyzing citizenship laws, it is a particularly revealing one. And it seems worth offer-
ing the broader generalizations this case suggests in order to assist reflection on topics of basic impor-
tance-the questions of what America's laws of citizenship, and the American community, should look
like today. (My forthcoming book, Civic Ideals: Conceptions of Citizenship in American Public Law,
pursues this among other arguments in a number of areas of law.)
1989]
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II. CITIZENSHIP IN THREE TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
DISCOURSE
First, some definitions.' By the classical liberal tradition I mean the
moderate Whig ideology preeminently exemplified by the writings of
John Locke, taken as a whole.7 Liberalism is properly identified with the
Enlightenment's concerns to replace allegedly natural social and political
hierarchies with recognition of natural freedom and universal human
rights, hegemonic church establishments with religious toleration, near-
subsistence agricultural economies with expansive commercial ones, scho-
lastic orthodoxies with new rationalistic and empiricist sciences, and an
aristocratic martial ethos with bourgeois civil peace. But I take classical
liberalism's distinguishing feature to be its insistence that the state must
allow for private as well as public pursuits of individual happiness, and
must therefore be limited to enforcing personal rights and promoting ex-
ternal goods thought to benefit all.
By classical republicanism, I mean the Renaissance tradition of "civic
humanism" variously expressed in Machiavelli, James Harrington, and
Rousseau, which also focuses on liberty, but understands it not essentially
as freedom from state interference but as active participation in and dedi-
cation to civic self-goveinance.8 Because of their concern for a vigorous
6. By explicating America's laws of citizenship in terms of liberal, republican, and Americanist
conceptions, I do not mean to imply that single, coherent, and wholly distinct versions of each of these
positions persisted throughout the first three-quarters of United States history. The traditions contain
many variations, especially since most actual American political positions have blended the different
strands together in variegated and intellectually untidy ways. I separate these three ways of conceiving
American citizenship and political identity only in order to identify analytically the main ingredients
Americans have mixed in justifying their political measures and to chart the characteristic tendencies
of each. By using an "ideal type," a simplified sketch of a relatively enduring structure of ideas and
arguments, to characterize each of these traditions, we can better appreciate the alternative possibili-
ties Americans perceived and why they sometimes chose to reject liberal precepts.
This focus on enduring structures of ideas or discourses is influenced by J.G.A. Pocock's example
and methodological writings, despite my contrasting characterizations of American thought. See
J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language, and Time (1971); cf. I. Kramnick, The "Great National Discus-
sion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787, 45 Wm. & Mary Q. 3 (1988). The use of cases to deter-
mine how alternative structures of ideas have influenced governmental decision-making follows my
own methodological argument in R.M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism,"
and the Future of Public Law, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89 (1988). Admittedly the analysis here can
only suggest, not confirm, that the failings of ideas, as opposed to other forces, have greatly influenced
the developments it depicts.
7. For useful descriptions, see H. May, The Enlightenment in America 3-101 (1976); R. Ash-
craft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1986) [hereinafter R. Ash-
craft 1986]; R. Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1987) [hereinafter R. Ashcraft 1987]
(arguing that, in the context of his time, Locke should be seen as a radical Whig). While recent
scholarship properly challenges Louis Hartz' view that Locke dominates American political thought,
most writers still see his works, especially the Letter Concerning Toleration and the Essay, as pro-
foundly influential. See, e.g., I. Kramnick, supra note 6; H. May, supra, at 38; B. Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 30-46 (1967); J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 424 (1975); G. Wills,
Inventing America 170-76 (1978); J.P. Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-
Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism 3-47 (1984); T.L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Repub-
licanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (1988).
8. J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 7, at 4, 49-80.
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civic life, republicans often are suspicious of the liberals' commerce, cos-
mopolitanism, and absorption in private or non-civic pursuits.
By "Americanism" I mean the identification of American nationality
with a particular set of ethnocultural traits and conceptions. In this view
Americans have a distinctive character, born of their freedom-loving An-
glo-Saxon ancestors, Protestant culture, and favorable natural conditions
in the new world, all rendering them a special breed uniquely fit to gov-
ern themselves in the land of liberty. Today such "Americanism" may not
seem a genuine intellectual tradition rivalling liberalism and republican-
ism, but its lesser status is due more to now-prevailing egalitarian norms
than to authentic intellectual history. From the Jacksonian era on, the
scientific racialism of the "American school of ethnography," the cultural
nationalism of European romantic thinkers, then the racialist anthropol-
ogy, history, and Social Darwinist sociology and political science of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all supported a "political
ideology" of "American racial Anglo-Saxonism" that was endorsed by
professors and politicians alike. "Americanist" thinkers often praised the
nation's liberal and republican institutions, but only because these were
elements of the nation's Anglo-Saxon culture, their real concern. A
Klansman, for example, might profess esteem for the "American repub-
lic," but in fact he typically cared little about "republicanism." His deep-
est commitment was to the preservation of a white supremacist racial or-
dering; his "republican" rhetoric was merely instrumental to that goal.9 I
turn now to some implications of these traditions for American citizenship
laws.
A. The Classical Liberal Tradition
Scholars often debate the characteristics of Enlightenment liberalism,
but the aspect most salient here is not very controversial. Most agree that,
at least rhetorically, classical liberalism was dedicated to the securing of
natural or human rights, held to be equally possessed by every person. To
recall the familiar phrases, "Locke proclaims men naturally "free, equal
and independent" and says they create governments only "for the mutual
preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates."" ° The Declaration of
Independence holds that all men are created equal and that governments
are created to secure inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. This liberal rhetoric has a very great value: it can be used to
9. Since the seminal work of John Higham, and particularly in recent years, acknowledgment of
racial and ethnocultural doctrines of superiority as important American intellectual traditions has
been increasing. See J. Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925
(1966); E.L. Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial Role 101-53 (1968);
G.M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind 61-102, 125-27 (1971); D.W. Howe, The
Political Culture of the American Whigs 38-42, 86-87, 201-02 (1979); R. Horsman, Race and Mani-
fest Destiny 3-24, 138-86, 298-303 (1981); R.M. Smith, supra note 1, at 233-34.
10. J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government 374, 395 (1965).
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claim basic rights for every human being, black or white, female or male,
alien or citizen.
But this emphasis on protecting the natural rights of each individual,
against other persons, against governments, and against non-voluntary
group memberships, also has disadvantages. The rhetoric of classical lib-
eralism must be adapted if it is not simply to dismiss claims made by
ethnic and cultural groups, economic and gender classes, and the smaller
political communities that make up a liberal nation, as well as by the
nation itself. The thrust of classical liberalism's oppositional language of
personal rights is to cast the claims of all types of associations, including
political membership, as threats to personal liberty. The constructive im-
plications of liberal principles for issues about proper civic and social
roles, relations and obligations, if any, are simply not clear.
Locke, for example, said little about such issues. He simply presumed
that people would join politically in groups or communities characterized
by a common language and by common familial and national origins, and
that fairly traditional gender and class relationships would largely en-
dure." He also expected his commonwealth to summon its members to
certain duties, perhaps because he expected patriotism to "grow out of
men's private attachments."' 2 But Locke left uncharted how the social
characteristics and affiliations he anticipated comported with the realiza-
tion of his liberal ideals."
Consequently, students of Locke debate the implications of his liber-
alism for the social relations that have often figured in legal definitions of
citizenship. Some, such as John Dunn, Gordon Schochet, and Richard
Ashcraft, note that Locke's stress on the duty to prepare all for rational
self-direction, and on the moral equality of all who are so prepared, has
some "startlingly egalitarian" implications. They suggest, for example, a
natural equality of the races, prohibitions on most forms of slavery, more
equal education for women and for laborers, less harsh working condi-
tions for all, and more equal property rights for women. The propagation
of such egalitarianism could not fail in practice to assist challenges to une-
qual citizenship statuses."
Most writers, however, see Locke himself as unwilling to pursue all the
11. M. Seliger, Locke, Liberalism, and Nationalism, in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives
20-27 (J. Yolton ed. 1969); N. Wood, The Politics of Locke's Philosophy 5-7, 81-96, 137-40 (1983).
12. N. Tarcov, A "Non-Lockean" Locke and the Character of Liberalism, in Liberalism Recon-
sidered 137 (D. MacLean and C. Mills ed. 1983).
13. See J. Locke, supra note 10, at 285-86; J. Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke 146,
240 (1969); M. Seliger, supra note 11, at 20-21, 27.
14. J. Locke, supra note 10, at 345; J. Dunn, supra note 13, at 175, 240, 255; M. Seliger, supra
note 11, at 29; N. Wood, supra note 11, at 32-33, 81-82, 121-33; R. Ashcraft 1987, supra note 7, at
111, 169-95; J. Axtell, The Educational Writings of John Locke 81, 345 (1968); G. Schochet, Pa-
triarchalism in Political Thought 268-71 (1975); Butler, Early Roots of Liberal Feminism: John
Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 135-50 (1978); Farr, So Vile and Misera-
ble an Estate: The Problem of Slavery in Locke's Political Thought, 14 Pol. Theory 263 (1986).
[Vol. 1: 229
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egalitarian implications of his frequent claims for universal human rights.
Two basic explanations are offered. Critics of liberalism have argued that
Locke's principles tacitly but inherently embrace at least some of the eco-
nomic, sexual, racial, and imperialist inequalities of his day.1 Others
have taken the view that Locke's failure to address these issues represents
no hidden intrinsic requirement of his apparently more egalitarian liberal
principles, simply a personal failure to extend his vision much beyond the
political issues that immediately concerned him (issues on which his views
did place him amongst the egalitarian "left" of his day)."6 On this inter-
pretation, any presuppositions of unequal political rights he may have un-
reflectively maintained contradicted his liberalism's core principles.
Scholars on both sides of this debate agree, however, that some of
Locke's positions supported greater equality for women than then existed,
and that it was not difficult to build from his premises stronger egalitarian
gender claims than Locke ever overtly advanced. He presented marriage,
like political society, as a voluntary compact between equals; he assigned
mothers equal authority over their children and claimed for wives more
independent property rights than English law granted; and he also sug-
gested that young girls, at least, be educated similarly to young boys. To
be sure, he briefly "granted" that the customary dominance of husband
over wife had "some foundation in nature" because men were the
"stronger and abler" gender. And overall the bachelor philosopher said
little about women directly, once remarking with apparent condescension
that he had "more admired than considered" the female sex. Nonetheless,
there can be no real dispute of the claim that Locke's liberal premises had
the potential to challenge gender statuses and many other hierarchical so-
cial relationships that he did not examine at length."
Even so, I do not mean to deny that beyond its silences, Lockean liber-
alism contained other elements that could serve as defenses for the une-
qual status quo."8 And it minimized even hard-to-justify civic inequalities
15. N. Wood, supra note 11, at 35, 115-18, 194 n. 51; C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of
Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke 221-38 (1962); S.M. Okin, Women in Western Political
Thought 199 (1979); Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism 3-5, 34-49 (1981).
16. J. Dunn, supra note 13, at 236, 240, 250; G. Schochet, supra note 14, at 248-50; Butler,
supra note 14, at 142-48; Farr, supra note 14; R. Ashcraft 1987, supra note 7, at 246-50, 265.
Thomas Pangle suggests, moreover, that Locke was well aware of the radical implications of his
principles for gender roles and the traditional patriarchal family, but that Locke found it politic not to
make them too explicit. T.L. Pangle, supra note 7, at 172-76, 230-43.
17. With regard to familial, economic, and political relationships, these issues have been widely
debated, so this conclusion seems firm. See, e.g., J. Locke, supra note 10, at 209-10, 364; R. Ashcraft
1986, supra note 7, at 257-85, 572-84; T.L. Pangle, supra note 7, at 230-43; J. Axtell, supra note
14, at 8, 364; G. Schochet, supra note 14, at 248-50; Butler, supra note 14, at 147-48; S.M. Okin,
supra note 15, at 199; Z. Eisenstein, supra note 15, at 42-43; B. Harris, Beyond Her Sphere:
Women and the Professions 78 (1978); J.B. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman 122-27 (1981); N.
Tarcov, Locke's Education for Liberty 70-76 (1984).
18. Among the most central: first, the liberal emphasis on protecting personal liberties and prop-
erty rights conducive to commercial growth could buttress arguments for governmental tolerance of, or
even support for, great inequalities that were allegedly products of free conduct in "private" spheres.
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by presenting citizenship as an instrumental status, one that liberal poli-
ties could bestow wherever it seemed most likely to produce a government
that would protect the rights of all and promote liberal goals. Hence if
sexual roles, poverty, or racial characteristics appeared to render some un-
fit for full citizenship, liberals could still hold this inferior legal status
consistent with guaranteeing equal "natural" or "human" rights for all. 9
Classical liberalism, then, had genuine potential to prompt gender and
other social reforms, but it was often cloaked by its other features.
B. The Classical Republican Tradition
"Republicanism," even "classical republicanism," includes a large, un-
ruly family of views, some egalitarian, some hierarchical, some isolation-
ist, some imperialistic, some fairly liberal, some virtually totalitarian.
Hence it is always wise to indicate which republicanism is under discus-
sion. For most, "republicanism" in America came to mean "popular" gov-
ernment, as opposed to aristocratic, monarchical, or mixed forms; and
some indeed stressed the non-liberal element that Pocock's work high-
lights, the ideal of fulfillment via politically active, participatory citizen-
ship.20 If classical liberal theorists left social forms largely to private
choices, moreover, republican writers were always concerned with the
types of political and social institutions that could make a vigorously par-
ticipatory civic life possible. Though he did not advocate classical republi-
canism, Montesquieu's account of ancient republican institutions, and his
analysis of how far they could be joined with the commercial and privatis-
tic predilections of the newer liberal vision in emerging bourgeois socie-
ties, were greatly influential on these topics."
Montesquieu identified "virtue," a passion for the good of the polity, as
the "spring" of the classical republics, and he argued that such passion
Second, Locke's view that governments should act according to the majority will of their citizens,
limited only by fairly minimal natural rights, meant that liberal states could defend harsh treatment of
minorities and outsiders as exercises of popular sovereignty. Liberal writers on public law, particu-
larly Vattel, argued further that in the relatively anarchic international realm, the necessity for each
sovereign people to decide for themselves what their self-preservation required meant that the rights of
individuals against them were often "imperfect," morally valid but legally unenforceable. Third, the
Enlightenment fascination with cultural and anthropological differences could support "scientific"
theories of racial and gender inferiority, although as these were elaborated in the nineteenth century,
their authors often explicitly distinguished themselves from "naively" egalitarian Enlightenment
thinkers. Locke's insistence on the necessity for rational labor to create property rights was also often
employed to buttress such racist endeavors. It permitted disregard for the land claims of "savage,"
"unproductive" Native Americans, so long as the fiction that they were purely nomadic was sustained.
19. R. Horsman, supra note 9, at 46-48, 190-91; J. Locke, supra note 10, at 399-400; J. Dunn,
supra note 13, at 175, 225, 240; E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations 175-76, 265, 279 (1787); W.E.
Washburn, Red Man's Land/White Man's Law 38-41 (1971).
20. J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 7, at 75, 436, 507, 550-52 (1975).
21. Id. at 491-93, 527; 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 42 (T. Nugent trans. 1949).
Hume's related concerns about the feasibility and institutions of a large commercial republic also had
great influence, especially on the authors of the Federalist Papers, as Douglass Adair stressed and
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flourished only with relative civic equality. Republics therefore had to
strive to limit the economic inequalities and luxury that commercial econ-
omies involved.22 Many republicans preferred an agrarian economy of
small, independent free-holders, who could not easily be manipulated and
who would be proud to serve and defend the land they tilled. Yet many
American republicans, like Montesquieu and Hume, were unwilling to
sacrifice the material and intellectual advances that the growth of com-
merce and urbanization seemed to promise. Thus they hoped that com-
mercial republics might develop a frugal and self-disciplined private virtue
that could compensate to some degree for the lack of public-spiritedness
commercialism engendered.28
But if that political economy represented an accommodation to liber-
alism, there were other elements in republican thought that could not be
easily reconciled with liberal egalitarian precepts. Against liberalism's
stress on inclusion and equal rights for all, most classical republican writ-
ers insisted that not all persons could be citizens, for two reasons. First, an
enduring republic required a homogeneous citizenry. Second, genuine re-
publics had to be small, bound to other peoples either by loose federation
or through imperial domination. The call for homogeneity could support
virtually any kind of discrimination in citizenship laws, including gender,
race, religion, and national origin. The second requirement produced
America's federalism, so often relied on historically to justify national ac-
quiescence in the inequities imposed by state and local governments."'
The demand for homogeneity is visible in Montesquieu's argument that
to inculcate republican virtue, citizens must be raised "like a single fain-
ily"-with a pervasive civic education in patriotism reinforced by frequent
public rites and ceremonies, censorship of dissenting ideas, legal limits on
divisive and privatizing economic pursuits, and strict restraints on the ad-
ditions of aliens to the citizenry. He also maintained that in modern times,
Protestantism was the religion most suited for republics, and that repub-
lics, like other regimes, should try to avoid the addition of new religions
(though Montesquieu urged tolerance if they should nonetheless arise).
Only if citizens' similarities led them to identify with their fellows along
almost every cultural dimension was a virtuous willingness to labor for
the common good likely to exist throughout the community.
Most pertinent here is Montesquieu's treatment of gender. He thought
women normally had more legal freedoms in republics than in Eastern
despotisms, but he expected the greater "family" of the republican com-
munity to preserve customary gender roles, with women in subordinate
positions. This belief is evident in his praise for the "admirable institu-
22. 1 Montesquieu, supra note 21, at lxxi, 20-21, 46-52, 96, 120.
23. J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 7, at 534-42; T. Jefferson, The Portable Thomas Jefferson 216-
17, 384 (M. Peterson ed. 1975).
24. I. Kramnick, supra note 6, at 9.
1989]
9
Smith: "One United People"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1989
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
tion" of the republican Samnites, who allowed the young men most distin-
guished by virtue and service to the community to choose among the eligi-
ble women for their wives." The custom dramatizes the republican
esteem for civic virtue, but since only men could choose, the inferior place
of women is clearly implied."
The classical republican esteem for relative economic independence for
all citizens also had a harsh side that worked against full female citizen-
ship. A healthy republic's civic body had to be small, because meaningful
participation in self-governance became more difficult as membership and
territory grew more extensive. But this did not mean republics could not
govern many people: indeed, classical republicanism's emphasis on the im-
portance of shared political membership meant that it could justify une-
qual treatment of non-citizens far more naturally than the liberal dis-
course of universal human rights. As the ancient republics and the
American South show, many republicans believed that the citizenry's eco-
nomic independence, military security, and shared life of civic virtue
would be impossible unless a body of subjects performed many of the most
arduous, dangerous, or menial tasks. Since these subjects-conquered peo-
ples, poor laborers, servants, slaves, and women-lacked the leisure, edu-
cation, and economic freedom they made possible for others, they were
unfit for the franchise or other aspects of full citizenship. They were
properly subject to near-absolute rule, so that citizens could live in
freedom.17
Some republican thinkers in fact advocated policies of imperial conquest
and rule, accepting the risk of corruption by foreigners. 8 Less bellicose
writers like Montesquieu and Vattel suggested instead that modern re-
publics might establish defensive confederations with other republican re-
gimes, meeting their military needs without establishing potentially degen-
erative empires. Many Americans took these latter works as textbooks for
their experiments in confederation and, later, constitutional federalism
25. Montesquieu's praise much more clearly expresses his sense of the suitability of such institu-
tions for the ancient republics than his own unqualified esteem. Like the Federalist authors, he was
well aware of the brutalities that inculcation and expression of republican virtue could involve.
26. 1 Montesquieu, supra note 21, at 37, 69, 96, 107-08, 138; 2 id. at 30-31, 52. Similarly, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who devoted perhaps more attention to the political significance of women than
any other republican writer, describes the true "female citizen" as one who thanks the gods for a
military victory in which all her sons have been slain. Rousseau later makes it clear that, because of
their different natures, only men can genuinely be citizens. Women contribute by serving their hus-
band and raising sons who will be good citizens. He admits there are exceptions, but holds this to be
the general rule that should govern policy. J.-J. Rousseau, Emile 40, 358-63 (1979).
27. J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 7, at 510, 530; E.S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Free-
dom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia 236-38, 380-83 (1975).
28. Initially Jefferson simply opposed admitting aliens, especially from non-republican back-
grounds, fearing a transformation of the "homogeneous" and "peaceable" American populace into a
"heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass." T. Jefferson, supra note 23, at 125. His equally exclu-
sionist views on women in politics followed the republican notions of Rousseau, influentially ex-
pressed in America by Lord Kames. M. Gruber, Women in American Politics 4 (1968); L. Kerber,
Women of the Republic 26-27, 243 (1980).
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(though some happily contemplated an empire of their own). 9 These
American republicans nonetheless insisted that their federalism must not
lead to a consolidated nation, and that constituent states must retain the
power to define their own citizenry to preserve their special characters.
Such rights in state governments were, in Jefferson's words, "the surest
bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies" in a distant, potentially des-
potic central government.8" These republican beliefs made the slogan of
states' rights a frequent, effective shield for state and local oppressions
against women and other unempowered groups.
C. Americanism
While both classical republicanism and liberalism claimed to define
principles applicable to a wide range of peoples, "Americanism" has obvi-
ously been more particularistic. Yet its range has still been broad, for its
advocates have criticized not only political but also cultural and social be-
havior as "un-American," and its roots run deep. Almost from their first
revolutionary stirrings, Americans began forging contentions that they
possessed superior characteristics out of materials provided by their Brit-
ish heritage, religious traditions, colonial experiences, and then-current bi-
ological and cultural analyses. Such materials were ample, since the Brit-
ish like virtually all other peoples had long advanced claims for their
distinctive excellence. 1 As both Bernard Bailyn and Edmund Morgan
have pointed out, many colonists believed that "they, as Britishers, shared
in a unique inheritance of liberty." Like other Englishmen, they saw
themselves as proud descendants of Anglo-Saxon peoples who had special
historical traditions, capacities and vocations that were culturally, if not
biologically, central to their race. They looked back to "a golden age of
Anglo-Saxon purity and freedom" before the Norman Conquest, which
had deprived the English of these ancient liberties until the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 restored them. But England had since become corrupt;
revolutionary leaders assured their followers that they were now providen-
tially destined to provide such a restoration in their new land.32
Later, in Federalist No. 2, John Jay argued for the viability of the new
national Constitution by proclaiming that "Providence had been pleased
to give this one connected country to one united people-a people de-
scended from the same ancestors, speaking the same languages, professing
29. E. de Vattel, supra note 19, at 18; B. de Montesquieu, supra note 21, at 126-28; The Feder-
alist Papers 73-76 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 255
(1969); L. Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion 30-31, 107 (1978).
30. T. Jefferson, supra note 23, at 293.
31. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C.L. Rev. 307
(1986). Karst's fine essay links these claims with nativist anxieties, and with quests for community
within ethnic subgroups in response to America's sometimes frightening "openness." Id. at 311, 327.
32. R. Horsman, supra note 9, at 18, notes such appeals in, e.g., summons to resistance by Josiah
Quincy, Jr., Sam Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Charles Carroll, and Richard Bland.
1989]
11
Smith: "One United People"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1989
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very
similar in their manners and customs." Hence he presented Americans as
specially equipped to undertake the great challenges of free national self-
governance. 3 His portrait was calculated to counter the charges of the
more republican anti-Federalists that a single large republic was impossi-
ble, and it deliberately ignored the great regional, religious, and ethnic
diversity America already displayed. It thereby shows that from the start,
many who were chiefly devoted to the liberal dream of a prospering com-
mercial nation were willing to concede to the republicans that free popu-
lar institutions required homogeneity to survive. Jay's remarks also indi-
cate that (despite Madison's call for multiplying factions in Federalist No.
10) many liberal and republican Americans were willing to equate Amer-
ican nationality with the country's predominant but far from universal
Anglo-Saxon Protestant heritage.34
Jay's reference to the shared "manners and customs" of his "one united
people" also indicates how "Americanism" could support a broad variety
of civic discriminations, including hierarchical gender statuses. Those
"manners and customs" included Anglo-Saxon practices, especially those
embodied in common law, and many inherited Protestant beliefs. Thus
Americanist outlooks always justified patriarchy by endorsing the
subordinate status of women prescribed in the English common law of
coverture and British custom, and by accepting with the dominant vari-
eties of Protestantism that while women might be capable of reading the
Bible and directing the home, only harm could come from granting them
political equality."
My linkage of America's patriarchal social structure with these
ethnocultural conceptions of civic identity that include racism and incipi-
ent American nativism may, however, seem suspect. Obviously patriarchy
predates the United States, and it has not been limited to any particular
ethnocultural identity. I contend nonetheless that patriarchy has been de-
fended in United States history primarily via "Americanist" discourse,
that is, by joint appeals to traditions, customs, the common law, the "nat-
ural order of things," and the divine ordinance, that all define a special
"American way of life." And I suggest that this source of discursive de-
fenses is not accidental. It arises because patriarchy's appeal is in large
measure the same as the appeal of racial and ethnic forms of civic ine-
quality: all these hierarchies preserve a community order and identity that
33. J. Higham, supra note 9; E.L. Tuveson, supra note 9; The Federalist Papers, supra note
29, at 38.
34. J. Higham, Send These To Me 31 (1975); G.B. Nash, Red, White and Black: The Peoples of
Early America (1974); R. Kelley, The Cultural Pattern in American Politics 31-80 (1979); H. Stor-
ing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 15-23 (1981); T.J. Archdeacon, Becoming American: An
Ethnic History 1-26 (1983).
35. B. Harris, supra note 17, at 15-19; E. Flexner, Century of Struggle 7-9 (1975); C. Degler, At
Odds: Woman and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present 15-16, 73 (1980).
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the dominant white male citizens find more comfortable, particularly in
times of change and stress, than liberalism's egalitarianism.
These commonalities between patriarchal defenses and other ethnocul-
tural interpretations of American identity have frequently been noted.
The nineteenth century women's rights activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton
argued in 1860 that racial and gender prejudices are "produced by the
same cause, and manifested very much in the same way. The Negro's skin
and the woman's sex are both prima facie evidence that they were in-
tended to be in subjection to the white Saxon man." Aileen Kraditor
maintained in regard to the late nineteenth century that when "antisuf-
fragists defended the home from woman suffrage, they were defending the
ideal of the white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, sober, middle-class home in
which the mother was queen of a realm she never left except to perform
good works for the less fortunate." The manner in which Americanist
appeals have taken up patriarchy as a traditional set of customs Ameri-
cans should preserve, even though it predates "Americanism," thus seems
clear enough. At the least, as Virginia Sapiro observes, American policies
regarding political membership "show once again that racism, sexism, and
xenophobia do not merely exist in parallel but rather are systematically
interrelated within the political community."" As ethnocultural concep-
tions of American nationality received more elaborate intellectual articula-
tions over time, American courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries often affirmed limitations on female citizenship by relying ex-
plicitly on such notions, often in alliances with republican conceptions that
the nation's governors found more compelling than liberal claims for
equal human rights. To that story I now turn.
III. WOMEN AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN LAW TO 1937
A. The Colonial Era
In colonial America, the legal status of women was governed largely by
the English common law of coverture. Despite regional variations, more-
over, most of the colonists would always have concurred with Blackstone's
1766 interpretation of that doctrine, at least as an ideal to be approached.
In Blackstone's view, coverture absolutely subsumed the legal identity of
the married woman, the feme covert, to that of her husband. Married
women were thus subjects not only of the crown but of their spouses,
leaving them without any meaningful civic rights of their own. From early
on in the colonial era, American courts with equity powers did rule, con-
36. Stanton quoted in C.A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 129-30 (1979);
A.S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890-1920, at 123-24 (1965); V. Sapiro,
Women, Citizenship and Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United States,
13 Pol. & Soc. 1, 2-4 (1984); cf. W.D. Jordan, On the Bracketing of Blacks and Women in the Same
Agenda, in The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits 287-90 (J.P. Greene ed. 1987).
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trary to Blackstone, that American wives could hold separate estates; but
only a tiny percentage of married women actually did so. In addition, the
unmarried adult woman, thefeme sole, did have an independent legal per-
sonality, and in the colonial era sometimes could even vote. But again, this
appearance of relative equality is misleading. While the number of single
women grew during the colonial era, it probably reached only ten to fif-
teen percent of the female population, and few single women ever exer-
cised their rights of franchise. The political subordination of women to
men was thus accepted as part of the customary British, and British-
American, way of life."7
Even so, inherited views of women did undergo some modifications in
the colonial era. While the dominant strains of Protestantism still re-
garded women as unfit for political or religious office, they rejected no-
tions in some medieval thought depicting women as innately inclined to be
wanton temptresses. American Protestants instead portrayed mothers as
natural custodians of Christian morality and governesses of the household
and children. In practice colonial women often assumed more equal re-
sponsibilities for both home and work due to the demanding conditions of
frontier life. In the relatively few urban, commercial areas, single women
could be declared "feme sole traders," entitled to sue, conduct businesses,
enter into contracts, sell real property, and be attorneys-in-fact, though
not in law.
Yet the greater equality sometimes reflected in slightly broader rights
for women in colonial customs than in English law only reflected the eco-
nomic realities of life in the thinly populated colonies. It did not funda-
mentally alter the inferior status held to be appropriate to a female British
subject, in the colonies as in the home countries. As the colonies became
more settled, most if not all the early departures from that inferior status
were undone. While the colonies' population increases were accompanied
by growing numbers of single women, with theoretically greater legal
rights than married women, most of thesefeme soles found it very hard to
provide for themselves in the colonial men's world. Few had property or
training enabling them to compete economically, and few men would as-
sist them in gaining such competency. These impoverished unmarried
37. L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 15-16, 28; C. Degler, supra note 35, at 8; J.H. Wilson, The
Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution, in The American Revolution: Explora-
tions in the History of American Radicalism 393 (A.F. Young ed. 1976); A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson,
Sexism and the Law 74 (1978); E.C. Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage 74 (1978); N. Taub & E.
Schneider, Perspective on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in The Politics of Law 118
(D. Kairys ed. 1982); S. Lebsock, The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern
Town 1784-1860, at 54-57 (1984); M. Salmon, Women and the Law of Property in Early America
xv-xvi, 14-30 (1986); E.F. Crane, Dependence in the Era of Independence: The Role of Women in a
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women and widows were hardly well situated to lead crusades for
women's rights."'
B. The Revolutionary Era
Then came the American Revolution. Whatever their other differences,
colonial adherents of classical liberalism, republicanism, and the more
ethnocultural notions of political identity that would supply the raw
materials for Americanism were initially able to work in concert. Revolut-
ionaries of all ideological stripes could agree that tyrannical (illiberal),
monarchical (unrepublican), English (un-American) rule must go. As
John Higham has detailed, while Americans claimed that the Anglo-
Saxon culture or race (the two concepts were not sharply distinguished)
was particularly suited for personal liberty and republican self-govern-
ment, in the revolutionary years that contention was not an argument
against inclusiveness. Most American leaders were confident that all
Europeans, at least, could be assimilated into these virtuous Anglo-Saxon
traits.89
Despite their liberating consequences for white men, however, the
Revolution and the formation of the new confederated state republics after
1776 on balance moved women further away from full, equal civic status.
As Joan Hoff Wilson has stressed, the new governments continued the
"civilizing" process of adhering more fully to Blackstone's view of married
women's subordinate status, as both natural law and time-honored custom
allegedly demanded. The increased enforcement of the common law's cov-
erture was evident, for example, in the way the revolutionary governments
treated married women. A colonial woman who actively worked against
the revolutionary cause could be prosecuted as a traitor in the way that
British loyalist men were, but a woman who simply followed her husband
in returning to Britain was held to have exercised no choice of her own.
She had simply done her marital duty. He had chosen for her, and hence
she had not committed treason or forfeited all property rights by that act
alone. Massachusetts did pass statutes requiring women whose husbands
had left to fight with Britain to profess their own allegiance to the revolu-
tionary cause in order to retain their property rights, and others indicating
that a choice to follow him would be viewed as treason. But this attention
to the woman's own decisions was unusual. The common assumption was
that she had no political views of her own unless her overt acts proved
38. For analyses of the status of colonial women, with some differing assessments of the degree
and significance of their independence, see J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 396, 414-15; A. Sachs &
J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 69-75; N. Taub & E. Schneider, supra note 37, at 136; M. Salmon,
supra note 37, at 44-53; E.F. Crane, supra note 37, at 258-62; B. Harris, supra note 17, at 3, 16;
J.B. Elshtain, supra note 17, at 56-61, 72-74; E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 9; C. Degler, supra note
35, at 5, 193-94; B.L. Epstein, The Politics of Domesticity 41 (1981).
39. J. Higham, supra note 9, at 9-11, 20-33, 137; J. Higham, supra note 34, at 31-33.
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otherwise. The statutes on treason-themselves a reflection of ethnocul-
tural views of persons as having an inborn, "natural" political iden-
tity-thus extended that outlook to include an endorsement of the natural
subordination of American women to their men.4
Even more strikingly, the new state constitutions also generally re-
stricted the franchise to men, beginning with New York's express provi-
sion to this effect in 1777. The voting rights that some property-holding
single women had exercised in the colonial era were thus lost everywhere
but in New Jersey, and in 1807 that state revoked the anomalous grant of
female suffrage in its initial constitution."1 While Lockean liberal thought
contained some elements that could have been used to challenge the une-
qual status of women, they were muted in his work, as noted above. And
such liberalism was thoroughly intermixed in early American thought
with the views of republican writers who (with a few exceptions such as
Condorcet) usually positively endorsed the exclusion of women from full
citizenship. After all, American republicans identified citizenship with
material self-reliance, participation in public life, and martial virtue. The
very words "public" and "virtue" derived from Latin terms signifying
manhood. Since women were generally economically dependent on their
husbands, and limited in their military capacities, women could not be full
participants in the republic. Linda Kerber has shown that the leaders of
the founding generation instead defined for women the role of "republican
mothers," a role that drew on Protestant beliefs and evolved quite easily
into the more general "domestic sphere" ideology that prevailed in the
nineteenth century. Women could sew, cook, or raise money for the revo-
lutionary cause; they played major roles in colonial boycotts; and some-
times they even issued broadsides on behalf of republican political princi-
ples. But their main contributions came in their care of the home and
children. They were not to vote or fight. Even the relatively egalitarian
Jefferson claimed that women must always be excluded from public delib-
erations and offices, for "depravation of morals" would result if they
should "mix promiscuously in gatherings of men."4
Women often endorsed these views themselves. Their political con-
sciousness may have exceeded the negligible amount men attributed to
40. L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 9, 123-36; J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 387, 414; A. Sachs &
J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 69; E.F. Crane, supra note 37, at 254-62; DePauw, Woman and the
Law: The Colonial Period, 6 Hum. Rts. 107 (1977); J. Kettner, The Development of American
Citizenship 1608-1870, at 198 (1978); Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American
Revolution, 13 Signs 59, 68-71 (1987).
41. J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 418; A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 74; Gunder-
sen, supra note 40, at 65-66.
42. M. Gruber, supra note 28, at 4; L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 7-33, 102-06, 283-88; C.
Degler, supra note 35, at 26, 336; E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 45; E.F. Crane, supra note 37, at
26-69, 255; F. McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 70
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them, as Mary Beth Norton has argued. Yet it was rarely overtly high, so
that even expressions of support for republicanism were relatively infre-
quent among American wives. More typically, women became involved in
public life during the revolution only when they deferentially petitioned
the new governments to be allowed to join husbands in exile, or to win the
release of imprisoned male relatives. Those governments simply ignored
the few more directly political petitions women presented. To be sure,
some revolutionaries, female and male, glimpsed the case for civic equality
that liberal republican principles could provide, and perhaps more women
would have done so if the times had been more propitious. But in the end,
the thought and practice of the new regimes only consigned women even
more explicitly to the domestic role they were held to be fitted for by
nature and tradition.4
C. The Constitution and the Federalist Years
While classical liberalism's egalitarian precepts posed no challenge to
the subordination of women in the revolutionary and Confederation eras,
tensions did surface between other classical liberal and republican com-
mitments. Many historians now portray the process by which the Consti-
tution was adopted as a struggle between more liberal Federalists, who
were dissatisfied with the insecurity of property rights under the demo-
cratic state constitutions and with the lack of power to promote commerce
nationally, and more republican Anti-Federalists, who were wary of a re-
mote new central government ruling a vast territory with the aid of exten-
sive financial and military power. The general view is that on the whole
the liberals initially prevailed: Americans created a new national govern-
ment with open borders that emphasized private rights and commercial
growth more than political participation or agrarian civic virtue.4 None-
theless, the states retained considerable powers to define the memberships
of their smaller republics themselves, and they continued to do so in re-
strictive "Americanist" ways. The Constitution did nothing to oppose
their denials of political and property rights to women, or their racial
restrictions affecting African and Native Americans. Indeed, it did not
even clearly preclude the states from adopting their own naturalization
policies. The early Congresses, moreover, imposed overt federal racial and
ideological requirements for the acquisition of citizenship via naturaliza-
43. L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 31-35, 73-95, 285-87; E:F. Crane, supra note 37, at 256-58;
J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 419-21, 426-27; Gundersen, supra note 40, at 73-74; M. B. Norton,
Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women 1750-1860, at 170-94
(1980); Norton, The Evolution of White Women's Experience in Early America, 89 Am. Hist. Rev.
593, 615-17 (1984).
44. G. Wood, supra note 29; Wood, The Foundations of American Freedom, in Freedom in
America (N. Graebner ed. 1971); I. Kramnick, supra note 6, at 5; H. Storing, supra note 34; Scham-
bra, The Roots of the American Public Philosophy, 67 Pub. Interest 36, 37-42 (1982).
1989]
17
Smith: "One United People"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1989
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
tion, though they did not address female naturalization." That silence
only confirmed how little attention lawmakers gave to the implications of
their officially egalitarian doctrines of human rights for the status of
women.
A rare example of a revolutionary intellectual actually trying to recon-
cile his liberal and republican precepts with women's traditional politi-
cally powerless status came in James Wilson's 1790-91 Lectures on Law.
The lectures elaborated the comprehensive legal and political philosophy
of the founding generation's leading legal scholar. Wilson was heavily in-
fluenced by the republicanism of the Scottish Enlightenment, but he was
also a fervent Protestant, and a liberal who ultimately emphasized private
pursuits over public ones. He also revered the common law as a means of
injecting a restraining concern for tradition into popular governments. As
an apparent aside, in one lecture Wilson explained to the ladies in his
audience why they lacked full political status. To do so, he combined all
three ideological strains to defend the propriety of a separate "domestic
sphere" for "republican mothers."""
Wilson's tone was casual and condescending, but his arguments re-
vealed the great difficulties of his task, especially given his proudly egali-
tarian liberal republicanism. His liberalism spoke when Wilson unequivo-
cally assured women that, contrary to traditional views of female
inferiority, they were "neither less honest, nor less virtuous, nor less wise"
than men. Why, then, should they not participate in politics? Wilson first
appealed to a strongly privatistic version of liberalism, arguing that "pub-
lick government and publick law" were made not for themselves but "for
something better," for "domestick society." And he argued that women
formed the "better part" of such society-that is, if they did not acquire
"masculine" characteristics through public pursuits. Here Wilson moved
to ethnocultural, naturalistic Americanism and republicanism: women
should develop their unique qualities, bestowed by nature and its Creator,
so that they might "embellish" and "exalt" the nation's social life by their
"beauty," "virtue," and "affection." Their proper political role, again,
was simply to form their daughters for similar service, and to refine the
45. From 1790 to 1870, only whites could be naturalized. (Blacks were then added; in 1924,
Native Americans were naturalized, while most persons of Asian origins were still ineligible until the
1940s.) Jeffersonian Republicans, fearful of aristocracy, added to the 1795 naturalization act a provi-
sion requiring the abandonment of any hereditary titles. H. Kohn, supra note 3, at 13, 138; J.
Higham, supra note 9, at 112; R. Horsman, supra note 9, at 18-24; J. Kettner, supra note 40, at
224-43, 264-65, 340-41; W.D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro
1550-1812, at 336-39 (1968).
46. J. Wilson, The Works of James Wilson 86, 102, 143, 217, 403-07, 579 (R. G. McCloskey ed.
1967). Wilson's early advancement of the doctrine of two spheres as America's true legal philosophy is
not mentioned by Taub and Schneider, who find little evidence that legal thought "played an overt
role in the initial articulation of separate-sphere ideology." N. Taub & E. Schneider, supra note 37,
at 126. I am indebted to an early draft of S.A. Conrad's excellent Polite Foundation: Citizenship and
Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 359.
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virtues of their sons, adding to male spiritedness the civility and concern
for others that republican citizenship also required."7
Subsequently, Wilson endorsed more liberal Lockean and Protestant
views upholding education for women and treating marriage as a civil
contract.' 8 But he defended the coverture status imposed by the common
law, albeit by a further appeal to liberalism's regard for private life. Wil-
son said the law ought, like a "benevolent neighbor," to assume "all to be
well" with husband and wife, so that they have a total identity of interest.
It therefore should not intrude on their matrimonial privacy unless this
presumption should prove so flagrantly untrue that the "peace and safety
of society" are endangered.' 9
Rhetorically, then, Wilson upheld a liberal recognition of female equal-
ity, and a contributing role for women in republican government. Women
were said to be of at least equal worth but distinctive abilities, so that they
contributed most by shaping future citizens from within their proper do-
mestic sphere. In much classical liberal and Protestant, if not republican
discourse, that sphere was actually higher than that of government. But
Wilson's synthesis was far from seamless. The contribution of "republican
mothers" was too indirect for women truly to be equal republican citizens.
And while liberalism might lead the state to defer to the private arrange-
ments of husband and wife, such deference did not logically imply that the
male should be the sole public representative of their united identity. That
step rested on embracing the inegalitarian naturalistic assumptions of the
"destiny" of women embodied in common law and religious traditions.
But since Wilson's view of women's place did on the surface appear to
satisfy simultaneously liberal egalitarianism, "Americanist" outlooks, and
the republican insistence on social roles consistent with a virtuous, homo-
geneous citizenry, it is not surprising that this basic position became in-
creasingly dominant in the new American liberal republic.
Counter-currents existed in post-revolutionary society, but they were
very weak. A few voices spoke for broadening the education of women:
Benjamin Rush thought more history, biography, and geography appro-
priate if they were to be effective "republican mothers." In the 1790s,
Judith Sargent Murray of Massachusetts published essays suggesting
women might appear less inferior with more adequate education, and she
was gratified to see some slight growth in female academies, though they
were more finishing schools than training grounds for equal citizens.
These efforts strained to find grounds for greater gender equality primar-
ily in the Revolution's republicanism, but the. most influential argument
47. J. Wilson, supra note 46, at 85-88.
48. Id. at 599-600.
49. Id. at 602-03. One trusts Wilson would have judged this requirement to be met by cases such
as wife-beating, and that he would not have insisted on the sort of threat to third parties presented by,
for example, stray shots from a couple exchanging gunfire.
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in that cause built instead on classical liberalism's commitments to human
reason and human rights.
In 1792 a freethinking English writer, Mary Wollstonecraft, influenced
by the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Richard Price, by Tom Paine,
Catherine Macauley, and her general immersion in radical Enlightenment
rationalism, criticized Rousseau and called for equal female education and
independence in her Vindication of the Rights of Women. Often described
as the founding work of the modern women's movement, the book was
soon reprinted in a Republican periodical in America. It quickly won crit-
icism from Federalist traditionalists, but its assaults on excessive absorp-
tion in fashion, sentimentality, and useless feminine refinements accorded
with anti-aristocratic American sensibilities. Wollstonecraft's views came
to be linked, however, to the excesses of the French Revolution and to
radical calls for free love. As a result, they did not generate any significant
reform efforts in the United States during these years.5"
D. The Jeffersonian Era
The Constitution's deference to state regulation of civic statuses meant
that little litigation concerning women's rights reached the Supreme Court
in the first half of the nineteenth century. The cases that did arise in the
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian eras, moreover, largely endorsed the confined
legal status assigned to women by the common law and the states from the
revolutionary era through the early Federalist administrations. In
Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy,5" for example, the lessee of Grace Kempe, a
woman who had married a British loyalist and gone to England during
the revolution, challenged a New Jersey law confiscating the land of in-
habitants of other states who were guilty of aiding America's enemies. He
contended this law should not apply to Kempe's lands, to which he now
held title, because she was a feme covert. As such, her departure repre-
sented not aid to the enemy, but simply allegiance to her husband, an
obligation (among "the most important duties of social and domestic life")
that he did not think the law had been meant to override. Furthermore, as
afeme covert Kempe was not in his view even an "inhabitant of a state."
Her husband was the inhabitant-so again the law could not be applied
to her. While the U.S. Supreme Court decided against Kempe's lessee on
jurisdictional grounds, Chief Justice John Marshall indicated some sym-
pathy to the lessee's views on the merits. That sympathy is revealing.
Clearly if a married woman's status was so subordinate to her husband's
that she could not even be truly deemed an inhabitant of a political com-
50. L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 224-25, 279; M.B. Norton, Liberty's Daughters, supra note 43,
at 267-72; E. Flexner, Mary Wollstonecraft: A Biography 162-66 (1972); E. Flexner, supra note 35,
at 15-17; E.W. Sunstein, A Different Face: The Life of Mary Wollstonecraft 214-15 (1975); M.
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women 51, 157-78 (C. H. Poston ed. 1975).
51. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173 (1809).
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munity in her own right, she possessed in the law's eyes no meaningfully
independent citizenship."
Other developments in the Jeffersonian era did lead to civil law and
social reforms that in some ways gave women more legal rights and an
enhanced social position. As the nation pursued Jefferson's dream of a
western "empire of liberty," family separations became common. Both
sentiment and interest then demanded that states clarify the law of family
property and make land more easily alienable. When husbands left wives
and daughters at home, it was inconvenient for the women to be unable to
sell property themselves; and protective men often wished to secure their
female dependents' financial positions by giving them these rights. Even-
tually, state courts and legislatures began to respond by granting women
more extensive powers to inherit and transfer property and retain control
over their own incomes. A few states also began to liberalize divorce laws
mildly and to increase the parental rights of married women.
Americans began educating their daughters more extensively in this era
as well, accounting for much of the increased school enrollment of the
period. The education of girls, however, still focused on the domestic du-
ties of "republican motherhood." American female writers such as the
"American Lady" who published A Second Vindication of the Rights of
Women in 1801 and Hannah Crocker, who published Observations on the
Real Rights of Women in 1818, were inspired by Wollstonecraft's de-
mands for women's education, which bespoke the liberal legacy of radical
Enlightenment thought. But while Crocker agreed that women could ben-
efit from a more broad-ranging curriculum, she still believed it "morally
wrong, and physically imprudent" for women to pursue abstract studies
like metaphysics or public careers like law.
Some went further: Emma Hart Willard fought to teach the natural
sciences as well as domestic sciences in several northeastern female acade-
mies. And another exponent of the most radical currents of the Scottish
Enlightenment, the renowned Frances Wright, travelled several times
from Scotland to America in the 1820s, eventually becoming one of the
leaders of the American freethought movement. With Robert Dale Owen,
she edited the New Harmony Gazette, the journal of his socialist utopia in
Indiana, and later the Free Enquirer in New York. But she was best
known as the first prominent female lecturer in the United States. Her
Course of Popular Lectures, published in 1829, called for common
schools with equal education for women. She also spoke for the gradual
52. Id. at 177-78, 182-87. For a widely followed state decision that confined the membership
claims of married women so greatly as to render them virtual "political aliens," see Martin v. Com-
monwealth, I Mass. 347 (1805), and the discussion in L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 132-36. When
even unmarried women with property were not enfranchised by that state's new constitutional charter
in 1820, some complained; but defenders of the ban replied that unmarried women had "disobeyed
God's injunction to multiply and subdue the earth." C. Williamson, American Suffrage from Property
to Democracy 1760-1860, at 194 (1960).
1989]
21
Smith: "One United People"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1989
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
abolition of all slavery. But like Wollstonecraft, she was mocked as an
atheistic free love advocate. Her ideas began to bear fruit only in the
Jacksonian years."8
Although the legal changes during this period provided some progress
toward greater equality of condition for women, the widespread scorn for
women such as Fanny Wright, and the dominant understanding of the
purposes of female education, limited the significance of those changes.
State courts usually interpreted the expansions of women's legal rights as
steps reflecting female needs for special protection, not as expressing any
recognition of genuinely equal status. The support these reforms provided
for women's rights was thus fragile and was easily transformed into en-
dorsements of their separate and subordinate position.'
E. The Jacksonian Era
After Andrew Jackson drove the more nationalistic wing of the once-
Jeffersonian Republican Party from power, to be replaced by his Demo-
crats, political and intellectual developments worked for greater civic
equality among white men, but more harshly unequal civic statuses for
virtually everyone else. Just as white Americans had from the start re-
acted to the presence of African-Americans by limiting naturalization to
whites, so from the 1830s on they responded to the rise of abolitionism,
the pressures for western expansion at the expense of Native Americans
and Mexicans, and increases in European immigration by abandoning
their faith in assimilation and arguing for policies premised on Anglo-
Saxon superiority. Jacksonian Democrats tended to appeal to the "scien-
tific" evidence of racial inequalities offered by the American school of eth-
nography. Its doctrines burgeoned rapidly after Philadelphia physician
Samuel George Morton drew on the world's largest collection of skulls to
assert a physical basis for racial differences in his 1839 work, Crania
Americana. His work was applauded and extended by a popular phrenol-
ogist, Dr. Charles Caldwell, who maintained the superiority of Anglo-
Saxon heads, and by the prolific Dr. Josiah Nott of Mobile, who wrote in
1844 that the "Mongol, the Malay, the Indian, and the Negro" had now
been proven to be "in all ages and places inferior to the Caucasian."
53. J.G.A. Pocock, supra note 7, at 529-42; E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 24-29; C. Degler,
supra note 35, at 307-10, 332-33; E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 41-42, 46; M.B. Norton, supra
note 43, at 295; J. Blau, Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy xiii-xvii, 242-48, 376 (J. Blau ed.
1954); L.M. Friedman, A History of American Law 205-11 (2d ed. 1985); Kerber, From the Decla-
ration of Independence to the Declaration of Sentiments: The Legal Status of Women in the Early
Republic, 1776-1848, 6 Hum. Rts. 115 (1977); L. Cremin, American Education: The National Ex-
perience 1783-1876 (1980); C.F. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American
Society 1780-1860, at 27-29 (1983).
54. E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 46; N. Taub & E. Schneider, supra note 37, at 119; M.
Salmon, supra note 37, at 81-140, 189-93; W. Leach, True Love and Perfect Union 178 (1980);
Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts, 1834-1865: Reform, Reaction, or Revolution? in 2
Women and the Law 69 (D.K. Weisberg ed. 1982).
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Northern writers such as the physician John H. Van Evrie and lawyer
William Van Amringe, both New Yorkers, added popular works support-
ing these racial views, and in 1850 Louis Agassiz of Harvard endorsed
Morton's argument for polygenesis. The widely read Jacksonian organ,
the Democratic Review, treated these works as establishing what George
Fredrickson has termed the Democratic "public ideology" of "Herrenvolk
egalitarianism," justifying democracy for whites and their dominance over
non-whites. Subsequently, this ideology was refined by western expan-
sionists like Sam Houston and Polk's Secretary of State, Robert J.
Walker, to focus on northern Europeans, often lumped together as Anglo-
Saxons, in order to assert the "manifest destiny" of Americans to rule over
Mexico's territories in the west."
Whigs drew not on scientific racialism but on the historiography and
literature of European romanticism, as well as their own Puritan tradi-
tions, to defend the cultural, if not providential superiority of Anglo-
American peoples, variously defined as the "Anglo-Saxon," "Anglo-Nor-
man," "Teutonic," "Scandinavian," or simply "Nordic" race or races.
Many Whigs justified their hostility toward immigrants in these ethnocul-
tural terms, though less conservative ones clung to the faith that all cultur-
ally inferior peoples could eventually acquire Anglo-Saxon qualities.
Whig histories recounted the rise of "Anglo-American Protestantism"
from the Pilgrim founding and identified the United States above all as a
"redeemer nation," taking the romantic conceptions of unique historically
rooted nationalities in the writings of the German-American scholar
Francis Lieber and English authors like Thomas Carlyle and Sir Walter
Scott as intellectual supports for their outlook. The willingness of many
German and English romantic writers to connect the mythical old Anglo-
Saxon constitution of liberty with Tacitus' classical portrait of freedom-
loving ancient Germanic tribes made them perfectly suitable for American
ethnocultural claims. From such materials Daniel Webster and other
Whig orators constructed their mystical portraits of America's national
meaning and providential destiny, should it avoid corruption. For many
Whigs that heritage required the avoidance of contact with "un-Ameri-
can" populations, not their enslavement or extermination. These Whigs
opposed Jacksonian expansionism, though rarely on the grounds of strong
egalitarianism. 6
Despite those differences, male Jacksonians and Whigs generally
agreed that female equality was out of the question. It was of course in
55. G.M. Fredrickson, supra note 9, at 61-77, 92-102; D.W. Howe, supra note 9, at 140; R.
Horsman, supra note 9, at 108-10, 130-49, 208-35; P.S. Foner, History of Black Americans: From
the Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom to the Eve of the Compromise of 1850, at 374-75 (1983).
56. G.M. Fredrickson, supra note 9, at 2, 97-101; D.W. Howe, supra note 9, passim; R. Hors-
man, supra note 9, passim; E.L. Tuveson, supra note 9, at 165-75; M. Curti, Probing Our Past 126-
27 (1955); P.C. Nagel, This Sacred Trust: American Nationality 1798-1898, at 88-97 (1971); R.H.
Wiebe, The Opening of American Society 321-47 (1984).
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Jackson's 1830s that Alexis de Tocqueville formed and advanced his
profound commentaries on American beliefs and institutions, including the
circumstances of the sexes. His Democracy in America provided one of the
most influential formulations of the nation's increasingly stressed "sepa-
rate sphere" ideology, relying on appeals to nature and religion and also
"political economy" to suggest the appropriateness of purely domestic
roles for women in "industrial nations." Americans, Tocqueville wrote,
had "carefully separated the functions of man and of woman," since forc-
ing equality on the sexes would make "a jumble of nature's works." The
"natural head of the conjugal association is the husband." Yet while
women were properly left to "the domestic sphere," that very fact enabled
them to achieve their proper kind of "equal worth." They received suffi-
cient education to play their politically crucial role in shaping the "mores"
and "opinions" of the nation's future citizens. Tocqueville found the
Americans' firm insistence on this role for women, in law and custom,
"the chief cause" of their growing prosperity and power. Few in the
American mainstream would have disputed either his reasoning or his
conclusions."
Even so, in the latter years of the antebellum period, some further lib-
eralizing legal reforms did occur, and a genuinely egalitarian women's
movement began to develop. By and large, however, that movement was
not responsible for the legal changes, which were more liberal in result
than in purpose. From 1839 on, many states passed Married Women's
Property Acts of various sorts that incrementally expanded the powers of
women to inherit, own, and transfer property independently of their hus-
bands. By 1850, some seventeen states had passed such statutes. Conserva-
tive judges sometimes tried to invalidate the reforms as intrusions on pro-
tected economic rights, but those arguments were effectively countered by
Jacksonian claims to expansive state police powers. These laws gave
women some measure of the economic rights that most liberals held to be
fundamental, and they were supported in part by egalitarian female activ-
ists; but most scholars describe them as remarkably uncontroversial ad-
justments to the fast-changing economic conditions of the day. Westward
expansion and economic growth created family separations and a marked
increase in market transactions, circumstances that demanded greater clar-
ity in titles to family property and greater facility in exchanging property
when men were absent. These conditions were also conducive to the mild
continuing moves toward more liberal divorce laws."
57. A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 291, 590-93, 597-98, 600-03 (J.P. Mayer ed.
1969); Baker, The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-1920, 89
Am. Hist. Rev. 629 (1984).
58. Examples of state judicial resistance to Married Women's Property Acts include White v.
White, 5 Barb. 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479 (1847). For discussion
of Married Women's Property Acts and their litigation, see, e.g., S. Lebsock, supra note 37, at 84-86;
H.M. Hyman & W.M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law: Constitutional Development 1835-1875,
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Some scholars contend further that insofar as these reforms had
noneconomic motives, they were not so expressive of egalitarian senti-
ments as much as paternalistic efforts to provide women with resources
sheltered against debts incurred by their husbands or fathers (and to in-
sure that those resources were available to be inherited by their sons). The
original 1839 Married Women's Act, passed in Mississippi, mostly se-
cured women's rights over slaves, thereby enforcing racial inequality more
than gender equality. Although the later laws covered more typical prop-
erty holdings, none established full female parity in economic matters.
Most of the litigation involving such provisions, moreover, did not present
women's claims to independence from their husbands, but rather defenses
by couples against external creditors. 9 Hence while these acts, too, had
liberalizing effects, they were not expressions of any major ideological
shift toward liberal views of women. Even so, they were subsequently
cited by feminist leaders such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B.
Anthony as factors which helped prompt their broader political activism."0
In certain contexts, the courts of this period recognized women as hav-
ing civic statuses different from their husbands, tempering the eclipse of
female political identity that coverture involved. But again, when they did
so, the courts were usually moved by non-liberal concerns. In Shanks v.
DuPont,"' for example, Justice Story held for the Supreme Court that a
native-born American woman did not automatically change her national-
ity by marrying an alien; but he relied on the common law's doctrines of
birthright allegiance and limited expatriation rights, according to which((no persons can by any act of their own, without consent of the govern-
ment, put off this allegiance, and become aliens." Correspondingly, Story
noted,feme coverts did not become naturalized by marrying American cit-
izens. In Story's view, this acceptance of their independent nationality on
naturalistic common law premises in no way jeopardized recognition of all
the other "incapacities of feme coverts, provided by the common law. '"62
at 23, 52-53 (1982); Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 Geo. L.J. 1359
(1983); Basch, The Emerging Legal History of Women in the United States: Property, Divorce, and
the Constitution, 12 Signs 97 (1986).
59. See, e.g., Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848), a rare U.S. Supreme Court
incursion into marital property law. The case did not involve a Married Women's Property Act, but it
did consider a provision codified by Louisiana in 1825 which made a wife independent of the debts of
her husband (even when she had professed to underwrite them). The Beins unsuccessfully tried to use
this provision to void Mary Bein's obligations to Mary Heath for a loan Mrs. Bein had secured to
assist her impecunious husband, Richard.
60. L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 154-61; Kerber, supra note 53, at 120; E. Flexner, supra note
35, at 62-65; C. Degler, supra note 35, at 4-9; A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 78; N.
Taub & E. Schneider, supra note 37, at 119; E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 41-46; L.M. Friedman,
supra note 53, at 205-11, 251; Speth, supra note 54, at 66-91; W. Leach, supra note 54, at 174-78;
N. Basch, supra note 58, at 103-4.
61. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
62. Id. at 245-48. Story similarly regarded a divorced couple as having diverse nationalities in Ex
parte Barry, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 65 (1844). A New York court held that Congress had the power to
naturalize married women, "even against the consent" of their husbands, in Priest v. Cummings, 16
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Related ambiguities surrounded one of the few other U.S. Supreme
Court cases of this era that touched on the question of female citizenship.
In Barber v. Barber,"' the Court permitted a mistreated wife who had
been granted a divorce a mensa et thoro (a status in which the couple
lived separately while remaining legally "man and wife") to sue her hus-
band for alimony in federal courts, since they resided in separate states.
That permission implied that she held a distinct state citizenship, at least
for jurisdictional purposes. Yet in regard to state citizenship, courts ordi-
narily assigned married women the civic status of their husbands. The
Court dealt with this problem by stressing that women would be placed
"upon a very unequal footing," without relief in cases of interstate deser-
tion, were they to be denied access to federal courts in this way." The
decision can thus be seen as expressing either a novel liberal esteem for
female equality or a paternalistic concern for women's welfare, though its
tone bespeaks more the latter.
Nonetheless, Justice Peter Daniel of Virginia, joined by Chief Justice
Roger Taney and Justice John Campbell of Alabama, still found the deci-
sion both too egalitarian and too nationalistic. His dissent cited Blackstone
and Kent on behalf of the common law view that marriage made man and
woman into "one person," essentially the husband, so that the wife was
"not a citizen at all, or a person sui juris." Further, Daniel insisted that
only "the particular communities of which . . . families form parts," not
the federal government, should be permitted to regulate "the domestic re-
lations of society."" Daniel's failure to carry a majority means that, even
with its considerable ambiguity, this relatively minor case remains the
closest the Supreme Court came to enunciating a liberal egalitarian view
of the status of women during the antebellum years.
As many scholars have noted, the antebellum period instead saw the
further entrenchment of beliefs that women were especially suited for the
domestic sphere, concerned primarily with child-rearing, housekeeping,
and hygiene, and religiously-based personal morality. Those views were
partly challenged, though also partly extended, by the incipient women's
rights movement, which used "feminine" social concerns (temperance, for
example) as a basis of social activism, but also argued for equal human
rights as discussed below. As far as American lawmakers were concerned,
however, confining views of women's domestic role prevailed. Hence it is
not surprising that in 1855, Congress passed a new Naturalization Act
that did automatically naturalize all women who married United States
citizens, if the women "might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws." Congress added that qualification "to prevent the citizenship of
Wend. 617, 627 (N.Y. 1837).
63. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858).
64. Id. at 594.
65. Id. at 601-03.
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negro, Indian, or Chinese women." The law did not specify whether
American women who had married aliens lost their citizenship (and the
issue would not receive a definitive legal answer until 1907). The lack of
specificity probably reflects the fact that the act mainly addressed another
goal.6 It provided that all children born overseas to fathers who were
U.S. citizens would be deemed citizens, if the fathers had ever resided in
the United States. Faithful to the paternalism that pervaded the law, Con-
gress rejected a version which would also have granted citizenship to chil-
dren of mothers who were citizens.
While this automatic naturalization of formerly alien feme coverts, im-
posed whether they wished it or not, was not the chief aim of the act, it
did receive a brief yet revealing defense. A supporter in the House indi-
cated that the provision involved little real cost to anyone, because
"women possess no political rights," and so lost nothing by a change of
citizenship. Furthermore, the measure might lead a wife to do a better job
for her husband in the "instilling of proper principles in his children."
Wives would, in other words, be better "republican mothers," lacking any
power to participate politically themselves, but charged with conveying
political morality to children in the domestic sphere. This "reform," undo-
ing some of the legal recognition of women's independent political status
granted in the earlier court decisions, thus indicates that although various
liberalizations in the legal status of women did occur in these years, tradi-
tional republican and ethnocultural views of women's place remained
powerful and also found some new legal expressions."
The antebellum era did, however, witness the rise of a staunchly egali-
tarian and liberal women's movement, triggered by the abolitionist cru-
sade and its revitalization of the ideals of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. With the sponsorship of William Lloyd Garrison and other
antislavery leaders, women began to form female antislavery societies in
the 1830s. By the end of the decade, there were some 112 of these groups,
present in every northern state. An initial national conference, the Anti-
slavery Convention of American Women, met in New York in 1837. The
American Anti-Slavery Association also hired two female lecturers, Sarah
and Angelina Grimke, the first American women since Frances Wright to
become prominent public speakers on political issues. When the Massa-
chusetts Congregationalist clergy attacked the Grimke sisters for their
public involvements, they began writing and speaking in defense of
women's rights, invoking the "natural rights egalitarianism" of the En-
66. It imitated an 1844 English statute, which superseded the parallel common law requirement
there, and which rested on similar "domestic sphere" notions. V. Sapiro, supra note 36, at 8-9. In
Kelley v. Owen, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 496 (1868), Justice Stephen Field (plausibly) interpreted the 1855
naturalization act as intending to insure that the wife's citizenship always followed her husband's, at
least when they were becoming Americans. He saw this patriarchal intent as wholly unproblematic.
67. V. Sapiro, supra note 36, at 8-9; C. Degler, supra note 35, at 26-27, 73, 150; F.G. Franklin,
A Legislative History of Naturalization (1906, reprint 1969).
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lightenment, as extended by Mary Wollstonecraft to women. Similarly,
Stanton, Anthony, Lucy Stone, Lucretia Mott, and other leaders of the
women's rights cause from 1848 on had previously been active in the
American Anti-Slavery Association and other antislavery groups. Garri-
son, in turn, defended women's rights; but other antislavery activists ob-
jected to combining the two causes, a controversy that contributed to Stan-
ton and Mott's decision to organize the 1848 Convention that signalled
the beginning of their own movement.68
These women's rights activists continued to give some voice to themes of
"Republican Motherhood," to the view that their reform politics merely
extended their roles in the "women's sphere." But to defend their role
against male abolitionists, and to link their cause more explicitly with
blacks, they relied most heavily on the liberal language of human moral
equality in regard to natural rights, as the Seneca Falls Declaration
showed. In the end they combined both outlooks fruitfully. Once they had
advanced a liberal egalitarian foundation for women's rights, they could
use republican notions of citizenship to derive the conclusion that the
franchise for women was essential, something only the more radical anti-
slavery activists were willing to suggest for blacks."' Religious sentiments
also remained pervasive in the rhetoric of female activists; but more than
abolitionists, women had to break with powerful but confining elements in
traditional religious outlooks to support their cause. Thus it is perhaps not
surprising that of all the reformers articulating liberal ideals in these
years, it was the women's rights activists, especially Elizabeth Cady Stan-
ton, who carried the logic of these principles further than virtually any
earlier American liberals, male or female, had been willing to do. Stanton
called not only for the vote for women and for reformed property laws,
but also for basic changes in marriage and divorce laws, family roles, and
Christian beliefs to give women more meaningful equality. Despite its
failure to gain much hearing among the nation's lawmakers at the time,
such activism set in motion arguments that eventually became prominent
features of American legal and constitutional debates. Arguably, a trace of
impact is visible in some postbellum cases where the Supreme Court con-
strued the domicile of married women as separate from their husbands
when such a construction aided the woman's legitimate interests.7 0 But the
rationale for interpretations granting women independent status was not
sharply articulated, and the rationales judges did offer bespoke more the
continuing needs of women for protection than the abolitionist women's
68. C. Degler, supra note 35, at 303-06; E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 72-74; E.C. Dubois,
supra note 37, at 22-23; P.S. Foner, History of Black Americans: From the Compromise of 1850 to
the End of the Civil War (1983).
69. It is because Ellen Dubois's otherwise excellent study neglects republicanism that she can call
the "widespread belief in the importance of the ballot" a "somewhat elusive aspect of the American
political tradition." E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 42.
70. See, e.g., Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108 (1869).
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commitment to equal human rights. And the opposing view, that the law
should limit women's rights outside their sphere, and that at any rate
their status was a matter for state decision, regained even more force after
the reform passions of the Civil War had abated. 1
F. The Civil War and the Postwar Amendments
As Eric Foner has richly detailed, the War culminated in the constitu-
tional enshrinement of the Republican Party's ideology in the three great
post-war amendments, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth. That
ideology drew on American Protestant and Whig traditions, but it was
undeniably liberal in its Lockean insistence on the central importance of
free labor as the source of all productive value, as well as the best proof of
good moral character. Republicans had therefore insisted that although
the races might not be fully equal in all respects, every human being had
a natural right to pursue his trade and reap the fruits of his labor. Hence
slavery was the height of injustice. The Thirteenth Amendment banned
all forms of involuntary servitude; the Fourteenth went on to constitution-
alize beyond dispute the 1866 Civil Rights Act by extending citizenship to
all persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States and prohibit-
ing the states from infringing the privileges and immunities of such citi-
zens, or denying any person legal due process or equal protection; and the
Fifteenth prohibited racial restrictions on the franchise. Those liberal
amendments provided ample textual bases for assaulting various ethnocen-
tric inequalities embodied in American citizenship laws.7 2
Yet those victories for liberal egalitarian principles were accompanied
by two great and destructive splits among reform movements, splits that
contributed to the postbellum waning of their influence. First abolitionism
and women's rights diverged because many women refused to subordinate
their claims to those of the freedmen, a subordination evident in the fail-
ure of the postwar amendments to address female concerns explicitly.
Eventually, the debate thus initiated split the ranks of the women's rights
activists themselves. It contributed to the establishment of two separate
Woman Suffrage Associations, the National and the American, in 1869.71
The American organization, led by Lucy Stone and Julia Ward Howe,
71. Z. Eisenstein, supra note 15, at 162-63; B. Harris, supra note 17, at 78-85; E. Flexner,
supra note 35, at 89, 159, 226; A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 81-82; E.C. Dubois,
supra note 37, at 31-42, 184; W. Leach, supra note 54, at 8, 23, 146.
72. E. Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men 9-23, 290-300 (1970); E. Foner, Reconstruction:
America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877, at xxvi, 228-80 (1988). In Reconstruction, Foner some-
times refers to the "free labor" ideology as a "republican" one, in partial contrast to what he sees as a
postwar "classical liberal" ideology. Id. at 416, 488-99, 530. But he does not deny that the "free
labor" position is thoroughly Lockean, a fact that previous commentators, including Foner himself,
have explicitly noted. See E. Foner, Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War 192-93 (1980);
Farber & Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 Const. Commentary
235, 241-42 (1984).
73. E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 145-48; E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 58-78.
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reluctantly accepted the temporary primacy of black suffrage, while plac-
ing the vote above all other concerns of women and working for change
largely at the state level. These emphases represented a greater stress on
the justification of female suffrage in terms of "republican motherhood,"
as a means for women to fulfill their special functions by shaping local
policies pertinent to child-rearing, education, health and sanitation, and
public morality. In contrast, the NWSA refused to take a back seat to the
"Negro's hour," worked for change at the national level, and challenged
traditional familial, economic, and religious conceptions of women's role
as well as franchise restrictions. These positions reflected a more liberal
emphasis on full human equality; but in the postwar years they led the
NWSA to be viewed as too radical for many of their former allies, male
and female. (Indeed, even many NWSA activists refused to recognize how
much their aims threatened the structure of the traditional family.) Stan-
ton and Anthony thus labored in vain to alter the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments so as to aid women as well as blacks. 4
While the most expansive of the postwar amendments, the Fourteenth,
spoke of due process and equal protection for all persons, it outraged
women's rights leaders by referring three times to the suffrage granted to
"male" citizens-thereby providing some basis for assuming the amend-
ment did not affect women's domestic role.75 Moreover, in the landmark
Slaughter-House Cases, 6 the Supreme Court read the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments very narrowly, overruling interpretations
grounded in the free labor ideology of the governing Republican Party,
out of an explicit concern to prevent the amendments from interfering
extensively with traditional state prerogatives. The case arose when New
Orleans butchers challenged a monopolistic slaughterhouse charter,
granted by the state's North-dominated Reconstruction legislature, which
forced them to work at the Crescent City Slaughter-House Company's
74. E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 155-56, 223; E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 135-202; Dubois,
Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States
Constitution, 1820-1878, in The Constitution and American Life 184-88 (D. Thelen ed. 1988); C.
Degler, supra note 35, at 315-20, 342-50; W. O'Neill, Everyone Was Brave 18-21 (1969).
75. The first two sections of the Fourteenth Amendment read in full:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of repre-
sentation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
76. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 52-53, 56 (1873).
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facilities or give up their trade. The butchers claimed this measure vio-
lated the most fundamental right in liberal "free labor" ideology, the right
to labor productively, to pursue their vocation and reap the fruits of their
efforts. In so doing, they alleged it imposed an involuntary servitude on
them, in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, and restricted a privilege
of U.S. citizenship in ways that denied them due process and equal pro-
tection, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Former Supreme
Court Justice John Campbell's argument for the butchers contended that
the amendments had decisively repudiated the states' rights, republican
views of citizenship prevalent in the antebellum South, rendering national
citizenship unquestionably primary. This national citizenship, moreover,
was based on the liberal commitment to securing fundamental rights
against all threats, including any from the states. High among those
rights, as "property of a sacred kind," was the "right to labor. . . and to
the product of one's faculties."
By only a 5-4 vote, the Court rejected all the butchers' claims, via rea-
soning that ultimately appealed to the longstanding fears in American re-
publican thought that a centralized despotism would be inevitable if the
federal government could override the states' definitions of basic rights.
Campbell's arguments would mean, Justice Samuel Miller wrote for the
Court, that federal agencies could "fetter and degrade the State govern-
ments," which was arguably the precise goal of the amendments, at least
in regard to the rebellious southern states." But that possibility violated
the old Jacksonian orthodoxy of "dual federalism" more than Miller and
his colleagues could accept. He interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment,
which Campbell had stressed, as almost exclusively concerned with pro-
tecting the newly freed blacks against further racial discrimination.78
Of the dissenters, Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley most
clearly expressed how a "free labor" reading of the amendments did in-
deed support the butchers' claims. Each stressed that the Fourteenth
Amendment, especially its due process clause, had protected basic liberties,
including the "sacred" right to pursue "unmolested a lawful employment
in a lawful manner," against arbitrary restrictions of the sort they thought
the monopoly to impose. Field termed this "the distinguishing privilege"
of United States citizenship as well as a natural right (citing Adam
Smith), and he insisted a government could not be truly republican, or
free "in the American sense of the term," without that basic economic
liberty."
77. Id. at 78.
78. H.M. Hyman & W.M. Wiecek, supra note 58, at 476-78. This reading enabled the Court
later to indicate in passing that while the amendment should be read liberally to strike down laws
limiting jury service to whites, similar discriminations against women were perfectly constitutional.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
79. Id. at 95, 96, 105, 110-12, 119.
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The same clash between a liberal free labor interpretation of the
amendments and states' rights republican views reappeared in the next
case the Court decided, and here the justices explicitly wed republicanism
to ethnocultural views limiting the vocational opportunities of women.
Bradwell v. State8 upheld the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to
license the highly qualified Myra Bradwell to practice law. Bradwell's
attorney, the Republican Senator from Wisconsin, Matthew Hale Car-
penter (who had represented the Northern-based monopoly in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases) here followed Campbell's lead and centered his argu-
ment on a liberal interpretation of U.S. citizenship. He invoked the rights
of the Declaration of Independence as "privileges and immunities" pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment, along with due process rights, and
he contended that fundamental among them was the right to labor in one's
chosen vocation without invidious restrictions or discriminations.
Quoting Cummings v. Missouri,81 Carpenter argued that the "theory
upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain
inalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness, and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors,
all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the protection of
these rights all are equal before the law." He next contended that the
legal profession was such an avocation, that women were both persons
and citizens within the meaning of the amendment, and that it "opens to
every citizen of the United States, male or female, black or white, married
or single, the honorable professions as well as the servile employments of
life."" By resting his case on the liberal right to labor and drawing an
analogy between the discrimination against women and the racial oppres-
sions the amendment was universally acknowledged to oppose, Carpenter
made a very strong argument. He also faced no opposing counsel.
Yet Bradwell and Carpenter lost. Justice Miller, again writing for the
Court, provided another straightforward statement of states' rights repub-
licanism: the right to practice law was a privilege of state citizenship, not
United States citizenship, and therefore the state had the power to bestow
it as it chose.8" The case was harder for Justice Bradley, who had found
the liberal claim of vocational rights compelling against just such republi-
can states' rights arguments in the preceding decision. Hence he added a
concurrence that relied not on republicanism, but on arguments plainly in
the ethnocultural Americanist, patriarchal mode. Bradley invoked "na-
ture," God's "divine ordinance," and Anglo-American common law tradi-
tions to prove that man was inherently destined to be "woman's protector
and defender." She was instead destined for the "domestic sphere."
80. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
81. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321 (1866).
82. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 137.
83. Id. at 139.
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Neither "recent modifications" in her status, such as new property rights
laws, nor the fact that a few women did not marry could alter this "gen-
eral constitution of things," which Bradley took to be embodied in the
United States Constitution."
Bradley's opinion is thus a perfect example of how ethnocultural Amer-
icanist reasoning, appealing to allegedly natural, traditional, and divinely
ordered social roles and identities, served to justify the gender hierarchies
embodied in the ideology of the "domestic sphere." But while that ideol-
ogy's great historical importance has led many scholars to focus on Brad-
ley's argument, it was only a concurrence. It prevailed only by working in
alliance with republican concerns for states' rights, so that it also exempli-
fies the alliance of ethnocultural and republican arguments on behalf of
civic restrictions that has so frequently recurred in the evolution of Ameri-
can citizenship laws. The republican argument may have been preferable
to those justices who had not already rejected it on behalf of the New
Orleans butchers because it permitted them simply to defer to the states,
instead of explicitly endorsing hierarchical views like Bradley's. Thus they
could evade, rather than directly oppose, the liberal claims of basic human
rights that the "free labor" ideology of the amendments clearly advanced.
In subsequent cases where women claimed the right to vote under the
Fourteenth Amendment, this alliance of restrictive arguments became even
more apparent. Whereas formerly the states were clearly free to deny that
women were full citizens in their own right, the Fourteenth Amendment's
declaration that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to its jurisdiction were citizens of both the nation and their states
appeared to render all native-born women both U.S. and state citizens,
regardless of state law. Whatever might be true of practicing law, more-
over, in a republican government the franchise seemed a crucial privilege
of full citizenship. Thus, apparently, no state could deny it to women,
certainly not in a manner consistent with the new constitutional require-
ment of equal protection.
Feminists therefore claimed the vote under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In 1873, Susan B. Anthony actually did vote in defiance of a law making
it a crime for those who knew they were ineligible to do so. She was
convicted in a peremptory fashion by a Judge Ward Hunt, who cited
Slaughter-House, found voting to be a privilege of state citizenship only,
which the state could distribute at its unbridled discretion, and then di-
rected the jury to enter a verdict of guilty. Hunt also did not enforce the
fine he imposed on Anthony, making an appeal impossible.8"
But Anthony's general line of argument was presented more elaborately
84. Id. at 141.
85. United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 830, 833 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459); A.
Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 85-94; see E.C. Dubois, supra note 37, at 199-200.
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in a case that did reach the Supreme Court two years later, Minor v.
Happersett.6 Chief Justice Morrison Waite's opinion for the Court ulti-
mately reached the same result, but he labored long to demonstrate that
women were indeed equally citizens of a republican government despite
their inability to participate in it.
Waite first held that women not only were, but always had been, citi-
zens. He observed that the term had become common when Americans
threw off English subjectship because "citizenship" was thought "better
suited to the description of one living under a republican government."
But despite this identification of citizenship with republicanism, he as-
serted that the status was not much different from subjectship, involving
"membership of a nation and nothing more."87 Waite went on to argue
that the suffrage, in particular, had never been considered a privilege of
citizenship. He maintained, in liberal fashion, that it could be granted to
whoever would exercise it beneficially, citizen or not, and he cited state
practices expressing this view, such as grants of the vote to aliens.88 But
the longstanding belief that republicanism meant political self-governance
by equal citizens seemed to haunt him. Returning to the subject at the end
of his opinion, Waite added that republicanism must be defined not by
theory but by the practices of the founding states. He contended that re-
publican citizenship was not then held to require universal suffrage.89
Waite was, of course, right about the practices of the early states. Those
practices, however, rested in part on a liberal policy toward aliens and in
part on patriarchal common law as well as republican beliefs that women,
among others, were not full republican citizens, but essentially subjects.
Waite clearly felt compelled to concede to the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the liberal tradition it embodied, that women were equally persons
and therefore citizens. He consequently had to reject the claims of republi-
can theorists that political participation lay at the heart of citizenship.
Instead, he employed the classical liberal claim that political participation
is inessential to citizenship, and he deferred to the state's republican pow-
ers of self-governance, in order to appear to confer equal citizenship na-
tionally while acquiescing in the creation of second-class citizens by the
states. The belief that participation is extraneous to American citizenship
thereby came to be unequivocally established constitutionally, reinforcing
the privatistic orientation of American political thought.9 And Waite was
86. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
87. Id. at 165-66.
88. Id. at 171.
89. Id. at 175.
90. This view of American citizenship also proved useful for many other discriminations. For
example, in Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), the Court cited Minor to support its suggestion
that the law distinguished between "certain natural rights" that were "indispensable to a free govern-
ment," such as most of the Bill of Rights, and others which were merely "artificial" and often "un-
necessary," such as the right to suffrage (and the right to citizenship itself). Id. at 282-83. This
distinction was used in support of keeping Puerto Ricans in a subject colonial status.
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left with defining citizenship simply as "membership in the nation,"
structured, apparently, in conformity with all the social hierarchies the
national life involved. Thus in his hands the status quo was confirmed
rather than challenged by the discriminatory aspects of Americanism.
Considering the manner in which he employed only certain aspects of lib-
eralism and republicanism so as to avoid the obvious implications of rec-
ognizing full female personhood and citizenship, that may well have been
the point all along.
G. The Late Nineteenth Century
This suspicion is confirmed by Waite's stance in the other cases involv-
ing women's issues decided later in the nineteenth century. But in reaf-
firming the distinctive and largely subordinate "natural" position of
women, as well as of the nation's various non-white inhabitants, the
Court was quite consonant with prevailing intellectual and political opin-
ions. In postwar America, dominated by the Industrial Revolution, not
only advocates of black rights but also many labor leaders rejected
women's claims, taking what Alice Kessler-Harris terms a more "hard-
line" insistence on "two spheres" ideology. Women had been structured
by God and nature for management of the household, not the workplace.
That argument served what male workers took to be their economic inter-
ests in an increasingly competitive work force. Many in the nation's mid-
dle and upper classes also found such a view congenial, for they were
reacting to new immigrants from southern Europe and China and to the
labor unrest for which immigrants were blamed by trying to protect and
strengthen traditional "Americanism," including traditional roles for
women. Adherents of the era's resurgent nativist Protestantism, exempli-
fied by Rev. Josiah Strong's immensely popular 1885 tract, Our Country,
were reformers as well as reactionaries, striving to combat corruption and
social distress and to find new ways to maintain what they took to be the
nation's essential virtues; but they were not egalitarian in regard to race,
ethnicity, or gender.
Their inegalitarianism gained further credibility from the rise of social
Darwinist scientific doctrines that seemed to confirm the biological deter-
minism that appeals to woman's "nature," as well as racial differences,
required. To be sure, the growing prestige of the sciences that produced
new industrial technologies and of evolutionary theory also challenged
much in traditional Protestantism, liberalism, and republicanism, as less
conservative reformers pointed out. But Darwinian sociologists like Her-
bert Spencer and William Graham Sumner showed how evolutionary,
historical, "scientific" views of human society could be made to affirm
longstanding American values, the family, and the capitalist industrial
system as proven champions in the human race's struggle for progress. In
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so doing, they offered elaborate "liberal" theories of social institutions for
the first time, but in ways that subordinated many of liberalism's egalita-
rian elements to claims on behalf of inequalities regarded as both natural
and efficient.9 1
Even many activists for women's rights felt compelled to defend their
cause in terms of arguments reflecting this political and intellectual mi-
lieu: the differences between women and men were indeed more important
than their similarities, but their natural differences were precisely what
would help women fight the saloon, the unsanitary civic conditions, the
corrupt urban machines, and the "un-American" customs that threatened
traditional families. "Reform Darwinist" sociologists like Lester Ward
therefore challenged Sumnerian views head on, endorsing female involve-
ment in social reconstruction on "scientific" grounds of women's unique
capabilities. Under Frances Willard's leadership, the Women's Christian
Temperance Union worked for an exceptionally broad-ranging reform
agenda held to be expressive of such special female perspectives, which
historians now term "domestic" or "social feminism."
Egalitarian views did not completely disappear from the woman's
movement, but they became less prominent. The formerly radical NWSA,
for example, also increasingly adopted this line, making possible its even-
tual reunion with the AWSA into the National American Woman Suf-
frage Association (NAWSA) in 1890. The "domestic" or "social feminist"
women's rights outlook did represent a revision in "separate sphere"
views, with its contention that women were quasi-scientific experts who
could best address "housekeeping" social problems. And it was capable of
gaining support in "respectable" circles because it posed much less of a
threat to the traditional order. Correspondingly, however, it was also less
capable of forging alliances with working women and the new wave of
immigrants as well as blacks.9 2 Indeed, this perspective proved able to
adapt the compatibility of republicanism and nativism for its own pur-
poses. More conservative native-born women argued that Anglo-Saxon
males should grant their ladies the vote, so that they could help defend
91. J. Higham, supra note 9, at 19, 133-34; C. Degler, supra note 35, at 334-45; E. Flexner,
supra note 35 at 208-09; A.S. Kraditor, supra note 36, at 14-42; Baker, supra note 57, at 632-35; A.
Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage-Earning Women in the United States 84, 153-59
(1982); L. A. Cremin, American Education: The Metropolitan Experience 1876-1980, at 17-18, 387-
93 (1988).
92. E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 224-25; Baker, supra note 57, at 637-640; A. Kessler-Harris,
supra note 91, at 93-97; B. Harris, supra note 17, at 57, 100-130; B.L. Epstein, supra note 38, at
116-25; W. Leach, supra note 54, at 182; W. O'Neill, supra note 74, at 147. Nancy Hewitt has
argued forcefully that it is therefore misleading to focus on two gender "spheres" in American life,
because those "spheres" usually were divided along racial and, especially, class lines that generally
were, in her view, the more politically decisive alliances. Her argument is surely correct to assert that
these other sources of political interest and identity played vital roles; but as she sometimes recognizes,
it would be equally misleading to treat "separate spheres" simply as a convenient division of labor
adopted harmoniously by the male and female members of the dominant classes. Hewitt, Beyond the
Search for Sisterhood: American Women's History in the 1980s, 10 Soc. Hist. 310, 315 (1985).
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native America against contamination by freed blacks, the Chinese, and
southern European immigrants. And they favored obtaining the franchise
on the state level, so as not to set a dangerous precedent for federal inter-
vention in state definitions of their political communities.9" Elizabeth
Stanton herself stopped speaking of the ballot as a universal human right
and called for the franchise only for the "educated" of both sexes, in order
to block the uncivilizing and unrepublican influence of "the foreign
vote." '94 While such positions may have won over some who feared ethnic
diversity more than partial female liberation, they obviously did not serve
to challenge fundamentally traditional ideas of woman's role. Hence their
potential value to women was severely limited.
With American thought generally and women's perspectives specifically
taking these turns, one would not expect the usually conservative courts to
speak much in terms of gender equality. Indeed such rhetoric is almost
totally absent from the decisions of this era. There was a basic division
among the justices, but it did not reflect radical liberal egalitarianism ver-
sus notions of "republican motherhood." Rather, it was a division between
more Americanist justices who wished to keep the traditional family abso-
lutely inviolate, and nineteenth century Spencerian economic liberals, who
were more concerned both to promote economic growth and to protect
vested property rights. The second group was somewhat more willing to
view women as separate from their husbands, with distinct property
rights, and to permit marriages to be made and broken more easily when-
ever such rulings served their economic concerns. As in the Married
Women's Property Acts, this kind of liberalization often helped clarify
titles and to promote development by making land more easily alienable.
These justices were also much less concerned than the first group about
extensive legislative power over women and the family, and they favored
pro-development economic legislation; but they did draw a sharp line at
legislative invasion of vested property rights, which they viewed as
fundamental.
Adopting the more family-oriented Americanist stance most consistently
were Waite and Bradley (the author of the Bradwell concurrence); cham-
pioning growth and property rights were Justice Field, the famous archi-
93. Baker, supra note 57, at 642; A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 137-40; E. Flexner, supra
note 35, at 182-89; W. Leach, supra note 54, at 342-44; A.S. Kraditor, supra note 36, at 123-39,
165-69; B.L. Epstein, supra note 38, at 116-18; D. Morgan, Suffragists and Democrats 22, 76-94
(1972).
94. A.S. Kraditor, supra note 36, at 133; C. Degler, supra note 35, at 133. This strain in Stan-
ton's thought first arose in the postwar split with the Republicans, who insisted on putting black
rights first. Ellen Dubois suggests that the increasing willingness to view women's suffrage in exclu-
sively white terms was an effort to use racism as a means to "a kind of sex pride," an explanation
consistent with the thesis here, that virulent ethnocentrism is a response to status and identity anxie-
ties. Obviously, even women's rights proponents committed to human equality had ample grounds for
such anxieties in a tumultuous society that had discriminated against women. E.C. Dubois, supra
note 37, at 93-96, 176-179; Dubois, supra note 74, at 189-92.
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tect of late nineteenth century pro-industrial constitutionalism, and Justice
Nathan Clifford. I should stress that while, as just noted, the focus of
these latter justices on economic rights can correctly be labelled "liberal,"
they were no more solicitous of female equality than the traditionalists.
Again, American adherents of Spencerian laissez-faire economics gener-
ally viewed the sexual division of labor as natural and efficient, and so
both groups on the bench treated women as properly subordinate to men
in most respects. They also both employed the republican rhetoric of state
sovereignty and Americanist sentiments about the sanctity of the family
whenever they found them useful, regardless of any ill consequences for
women. The second group's economic preoccupations simply made such
arguments useful less often. And over time, with the swelling of the intel-
lectual and political forces just sketched, the Court as a whole moved to
encompass more traditional views of female status more fully. Later jus-
tices, such as Rufus Peckham, managed to fuse the two positions quite
effectively simply by insisting anew that for many legal purposes women
were the property of men.
In the 1870s, however, it was at first the Field group that carried the
day. The Court upheld common law marriages in a case where this set-
tled an inheritance issue, although it justified the result by stressing the
"policy of the state to encourage" marriage, even such unconventional
marriages.9 And with Justices Bradley, Waite, and John Harlan in dis-
sent, Field wrote for the Court in holding that a man could not be ejected
from his land by means of a paper served on his wife. Unlike the dissent-
ers, Field did not believe their "theoretical unity" at law should extend so
far.96 Then, in Bank of America v. Banks,9" Justice Clifford's opinion for
the Court held that a loan provided for a husband's plantation could not
be collected from the wife's estate, since this appeared contrary to the
state's intent in governing married women's property. Although the same
result could be reached by construing the law as concerned above all to
protect women, the ruling nonetheless displays a willingness to view the
property of husband and wife separately.
Almost a decade later, Field scored a similar victory in Maynard v.
Hill,9" where he wrote for the Court upholding a legislative divorce
95. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877). The Court subsequently continued this support of
common law marriages. See, e.g., Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490 (1884) (Field, J.); Travelers v.
Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423 (1907) (Harlan, J.).
96. I should observe that the dissenting justices were not equally Americanist in all areas. Harlan
was the Court's only real champion of black rights in this era and a strong economic liberal himself,
though he did support legislation hostile to Chinese immigrants. Bradley was more liberal in regard to
the Chinese, but not in regard to women or blacks. The Californian Field, moreover, was the Court's
leading exponent of republican and nativist arguments to justify excluding the Chinese from the coun-
try, though there were some legislated oppressions in his home state that were too extreme even for
him. C.B. Swisher, Stephen J. Field: Craftsman of the Law 205-39 (1969).
97. 101 U.S. 240, 246-47 (1879).
98. 125 U.S. 190, 206, 210-11 (1877).
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granted in Oregon to a man who had left his wife in Vermont without
support. Field admitted the husband's conduct was "shameless"; but with
majestic disregard for that detail, he upheld the legislative action. Field
expounded at length on how marriage was more than a "mere con-
tract"-it was "an institution," a "social relation," that formed the "foun-
dation" of "society," "civilization," and "progress." It was therefore some-
thing in which the public was "deeply interested" and a fit subject for
state regulation (as most contracts, in Field's view, were decidedly not).
Since this regulation in fact dissolved the glorious institution, one cannot
help but feel that the justice was really concerned with the way it enabled
the state to assign lands for development with clear titles. Field in fact
observed that if the case had invoked "rights of property invested in either
party," he would not have sanctioned state abrogation of their original
agreement. It thus seems clear that he was more concerned to protect the
sorts of economic relations he thought desirable here than to assist either
the family or, obviously, the woman.
Along with these cases, however, more traditional views of the husband
and wife's unalterable unity prevailed on occasion. In the same term as
Bank of America, Chief Justice Waite wrote for the Court in a case in-
volving a congressional statute that permitted settlers to claim Oregon
lands, with equal shares for the husband and wife. Waite held that the
wife "could not be the settler," only the husband, so that the grant to her
was through him, even though she would hold the land independently.
Thus his "acts affecting the claim are her acts." 99 Five years later, Justice
Horace Gray varied the pattern set in Barber and Cheever by refusing to
view a woman who had been unwilling to follow her husband to Colorado
as having a separate domicile. The earlier cases had indicated that women
could obtain independent domicile only when they had legitimate grounds
for their separation. Gray viewed the woman's aversion to living in fron-
tier Colorado as "unjustifiable" (although he still found for her on the
ground that the notice she had been given of the divorce proceeding was
insufficient under state law).' Similarly, Chief Justice Melville Fuller
routinely asserted the identity of the woman's domicile with her hus-
band's, regardless of her actual residence, in Anderson v. Wyatt.' And
by 1893, in deciding In re Lockwood,"0 2 the Court was again prepared to
admit that the states could deny the very personhood of women for legal
purposes. Belva Lockwood was admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court
itself, the District of Columbia, and several states. Yet Virginia denied her
admission to its bar on the basis of a law that referred to appropriately
qualified "persons." Fuller, writing for the Court, invoked Bradwell and
99. Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.S. 514, 521 (1879).
100. Cheeley v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 705, 708-09 (1884).
101. 138 U.S. 694 (1890).
102. 154 U.S. 116 (1893).
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the requirements of deference to state authority to hold that the Virginia
courts could permissibly construe "persons" as excluding women.
My contention that justices of Field's persuasion were more willing to
treat women as persons for some purposes, but only to advance these jus-
tices' economic concerns, gains support from the Court's treatment during
these years of the polygamy practices of the Mormons (who were almost
as much the targets of Americanist crusaders like Josiah Strong as
Catholics were).,03 The Court was unanimous in excoriating polygamy
and the Mormons. In fact, the justices vied to write the most stirring trib-
utes to the importance of the traditional family for America's republican
institutions and its "Christian civilization." In the first such case, Reyn-
olds v. United States,10" upholding a federal statute banning polygamy in
the territories, Chief Justice Waite appealed in Americanist fashion to
customs inherited from the "northern and western nations of Europe." He
also cited the republican argument, going back to Montesquieu, that po-
lygamy breeds despotism while monogamy is compatible with free govern-
ment. Thus his opinion displays plainly once again the recurring alliance
of republican and Americanist rationales for enforcing the traditional so-
cial order.
That alliance was equally visible in Murphy v. Ramsey' 5 and Davis v.
Beason,'06 where the Court upheld laws voiding the franchise of those
who practiced or advocated polygamy, respectively. Justice Stanley Mat-
thews defended denying citizens this basic political right by arguing in
Murphy that the monogamous family was a "holy estate," the best source
of "morality" and "progress." Hence the legislation was "necessary" for a
"free, self-governing commonwealth" to survive.10 Similarly, in Davis
Field took his turn denouncing polygamy as "degrading" both to women
and men and contrary to the laws of "all civilized and Christian coun-
tries," so that its mere advocacy could be made criminal.10 But in Mor-
mon Church v. United States,"0 9 while Justice Bradley for the majority
upheld a federal law banning the Mormon Church due to its practice of
polygamy and confiscating its property, Field joined Chief Justice Fuller's
dissent. They approved the ban but protested the violation of property
rights. While all the justices agreed that the traditional family was "holy"
and necessary to the republic, for some property rights were more sacred
yet. 1 0
103. The pertinence of these cases was brought to my attention by Diane Polan's unpublished
essay, Patriarchal Ideology in the Supreme Court (1980) (Yale Law School).
104. 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1878).
105. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
106. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
107. 114 U.S. at 45.
108. 133 U.S. at 341-42.
109. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
110. Similarly, early in his tenure on the Court, Field had readily upheld the patriarchal 1855
naturalization act in Kelley v. Owen, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 496 (1868).
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H. The Progressive Era
In many circumstances, however, concerns for property and concerns
for traditional family roles coincided; and after the turn of the century,
especially, the federal courts often took advantage of such coincidences to
buttress property rights while opposing female emancipation. For exam-
ple, a district court held in 1901 that, until a daughter reached 21, her
father had "a property right" in her services."' 1 And writing for the Su-
preme Court three years later in Tinker v. Colwell,112 Justice Peckham, a
disciple of Fieldian economic views, ruled that to commit adultery with a
man's wife, even with her consent ("as is almost universally the case as
proved"), was an injury to his "personal rights and property rights."
Justice Peckham was soon to write the Court's opinion in the landmark
Lochner v. New York a decision striking down a state law that limited
baker's hours in the name of a substantive "liberty of contract" found in
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. In holding that the limi-
tation violated what many took to be an essentially procedural constitu-
tional requirement, Peckham claimed to ask only whether the law had
some minimally rational basis. He contended that it was instead so totally
arbitrary that no process under it could be deemed fair or "due." Because
of this dismissal of all justifications for economic regulation, the Lochner
case has of course come to symbolize the Court's frequent hostility to so-
cial welfare and regulatory legislation from the late nineteenth century
through the early New Deal. Hence Peckham's willingness to view wives
as in part their husband's property was both of a piece with the Court's
still-growing stress on expansive property rights and, as time was to show,
a potential obstacle to legislative assistance to women." 4
This atmosphere still left open another route to justification for legisla-
tion benefiting women, however: the patriarchal Americanist claim, going
back to the legislative initiatives of the antebellum era, of women's special
needs for protection. That claim fit quite comfortably with the family of
111. In re Freche, 109 F. 620 (D.N.J. 1901).
112. 193 U.S. 473, 481 (1904).
113. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
114. In fairness to Peckham and Fuller, it should be noted that they did join (sometimes with
David Brewer) in occasionally assisting women in a set of cases turning on the issue of whether one
state is constitutionally required to give "full faith and credit" to another's marriage and divorce
proceedings. The Court's fluctuations on this issue are too involved to review, but their votes often
seemed to reflect a judgment on the merits of the competing claims of husband and wife rather than
the issues of federalism and state powers that dominated the debate in these cases. Thus they voted to
uphold later state proceedings that treated the woman's claims more fully and fairly-and they also
voted to uphold state refusals to honor divorces granted on more permissive and less protective
grounds than prevailed locally. But while these decisions did not treat women simply as property,
their concerns throughout reflected an Americanist adherence to the traditional family and woman's
dependent social role. See, e.g., Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U.S. 14 (1903); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906). The New Deal Court finally settled these
issues by overturning Haddock and insisting that states must always recognize the prior marital pro-
ceedings of other states. Williams v. North Carolina, 269 U.S. 287 (1942).
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perspectives that historians describe as "progressivism," including not only
participants in state and national political parties bearing the Progressive
label but also a range of other reform movements. Philosophically as well
as politically, many progressives rebelled against what they took to be
classical liberalism's portrait of human beings as atomistic bearers of nat-
ural economic rights that dictated laissez-faire governmental policies. In-
stead, progressives called for recognition of people and their economic re-
lations as socially constituted in diverse ways that public policies had to
recognize, but could often alter. Elaborating the "reform Darwinist" per-
spectives of the late nineteenth century, most progressives remained at-
tached to middle-class, Protestant values, but optimistic that new sciences
and new professions could devise private and public programs to advance
those values in ways that would benefit all. Their agenda was often
shaped by women's associations' focus on poverty, unsafe and unsanitary
living conditions, poor education, and drunkenness, as well as political
morality; and they emphasized how women's special experiences of these
problems gave them both distinctive vulnerabilities and distinctive insights.
Hence it is not surprising that many progressive leaders, such as Jane
Addams, continued to advocate female suffrage in terms of the special ma-
ternal qualities women would bring to political life. Indeed, many oppo-
nents of the suffrage accepted the need for some female social activism,
while shrinking from something so divisive of the family as the female
vote.
1 1 5
The progressive reformers who worked with the urban poor became
much more conscious of the problems of female workers and immigrants,
and more aware of the need for an institutional reform movement that
would work for their economic as well as political interests. In conse-
quence, progressives argued that in the new American industrial economy,
both consumers and workers required regulatory protection. But the Su-
preme Court that decided Lochner became increasingly hostile to legisla-
tion that interfered with the juridical equality of employers and employ-
ees; so arguments about the special need to protect women, which might
be more acceptable than claims for workers generally, seemed a promising
way to stem the anti-regulation tide. From the standpoints of protection
for all and of a consistent, egalitarian liberal feminism, this approach
proved to be inadequate, but there can be no doubt that conditions of
working women did urgently demand improvement. Conscious of this
need, and hoping in some cases to develop precedents that could be used to
support broader protective legislation, progressives pushed particularly for
115. An influential overview of progressivism is D.T. Rodgers' In Search of Progressivism, 10
Revs. in Am. Hist. 113 (1982). See also L. Kerber, supra note 28, at 284; C. Degler, supra note 35,
at 320-23, 350-54; A.S. Kraditor, supra note 36, at 68-70; Baker, supra note 57, at 641-42; A.
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minimum wage and maximum hour laws for women in certain trades,
and then for their ratification by the U.S. Supreme Court." 6
In both efforts they were able to employ the fruits of the economic and
sociological disciplines that were gaining increasing prominence in Ameri-
can intellectual life. By presenting massive amounts of statistical evidence
to demonstrate that women could reasonably be thought to need legislative
assistance, the female leadership of the National Consumers' League and
their attorney, Louis Brandeis, were able to win the first major constitu-
tional victory for progressive legislation in Muller v. Oregon." 7 The case
sustained an Oregon law limiting the hours of women working in certain
occupations.
The arguments in the case, however, indicate that it was on balance a
victory only for a slightly more expansive version of "two spheres" ideol-
ogy, not for female equality. Only the brief for the plaintiff, opposing the
law, asserted in liberal fashion that women were "equally with men" en-
dowed with "inalienable rights of liberty and property."""6 This was a
recapitulation of Field's extreme laissez-faire liberalism, so that women's
possession of formally equal rights only meant that they were entitled to
no assistance in the transactions of the marketplace: they were legally em-
powered to bargain for themselves on an equal basis, and if they failed to
achieve satisfying results, that was the price of ineffectiveness in a system
of economic freedom.
Brandeis' famous brief in the case (compiled largely by League women)
argued instead that despite any formally equal rights, women needed pro-
tective legislation, because their "special physical organization" made long
hours more hazardous to them. This argument did not in itself preclude
the possibility that male workers might also require legislative protection,
and many progressives viewed female protective legislation as the opening
wedge toward enactment of such laws for all. Nonetheless, the brief did
give a reassuring "scientific" endorsement to traditional notions of female
dependence. " 9 And in the hands of Justice Brewer, writing for the Court,
the mention of women's physical capabilities was transformed into a
wholehearted embrace of the view that, though women might have to
work at times, they were destined by nature for "maternal functions,"
child-rearing, and "maintenance of the home." It was in fact not so much
the physical harms the women suffered from long hours that concerned
Brewer, as the threat these harms posed to their reproductive role, to "vig-
orous offspring" and "the future well-being of the race."' 20 And he made
116. C. Degler, supra note 35, at 358-59, 401-02; A.S. Kraditor, supra note 36, at 146; E.
Flexner, supra note 35, at 215-16; A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 111-12; N. Taub and
E. Schneider, supra note 37, at 128; J. Baer, The Chains of Protection 10-101, 130 (1978).
117. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
118. Id. at 414.
119. Id. at 419.
120. Id. at 421-22.
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it clear that in his eyes, the problem was not only that female physical
weaknesses put women at a comparative disadvantage if they worked the
same hours as men. Instead, women's greatest difficulty was that by "dis-
position and habit of life" they lacked the "self-reliance" needed for suc-
cess in the tough competitive marketplace. Protective legislation would
therefore always be necessary, even if they obtained full statutory equality
of economic rights."' 1
By moving from the physical dangers to a woman, which were but-
tressed by statistical evidence however flimsy, to her psychic disabilities in
bargaining and the threats posed to her reproductive functions, Brewer
moved from more "scientific" to more explicitly Americanist arguments.
He also made it much more difficult to use his decision as a precedent for
universal labor legislation, as he himself emphasized. After the case, many
states rapidly passed protective laws for women, but they adopted univer-
sal labor laws much less often, and the courts usually struck such acts
down. Judith Baer has pointed out that Muller thus proved to be much
more an (inegalitarian) precedent in the area of gender relations than in
the area of economic regulation. Overall, the case's arguments left liberal
notions of gender equality hostage to the bleak economic vision of the
Lochner adherents, while the progressives achieved success only by en-
dorsing a separate spheres ideology that foreclosed most further gains for
women and men.122
Of course, for many progressives, female and male, and for many labor
leaders, the Muller view that women needed special protection in itself
seemed quite sound, even if they also favored regulatory legislation on
behalf of male workers. Some trade unionists, moreover, valued protective
laws for women as a means to reduce their competitive attractiveness vis-
i-vis male workers. Only the left wing of progressivism, or of the wo-
man's movement, would have contested Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes'
subsequent affirmation of a Montana law that exempted small female
laundries from a required fee on the ground that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not require imposing "a fictitious equality where there is a real
difference." '123 In subsequent cases, the Court sustained hours legislation
for women by routinely citing Muller."4 But when the case looked more
121. Id. at 422. Like Rousseau and Justice Bradley, Brewer admitted that "there are individual
exceptions," and that women had many advantages over men; "but looking at it from the viewpoint of
the effort to maintain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality". Id. See also A.
Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 113; A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 185; J. Baer,
supra note 116, at 59-62.
122. Muller even inspired restrictive "protective" legislation in states which had previously been
anti-protectionist. See A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 114-16; A. Kessler-Harris, supra
note 91, at 186-87; J. Baer, supra note 116, at 66; N. Taub & E. Schneider, supra note 37, at 129-
30.
123. Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912); A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 187-
89, 202-05; N.F. Cott, supra note 115, at 23-25.
124. See, e.g., Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718
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difficult, as in California, where women employed in harvesting and other
agricultural activities were excluded from protection, supporters of protec-
tive laws were quick to emphasize their concern for women's child-pro-
ducing role, as well as Americanist nativism. In Miller v. Wilson, 1915,
the state's brief justified its legislation on the ground that the law might
help "check the rapid decline in reproduction of the older American
stocks"-a racial claim which served as an oblique defense for denying
protection to female harvesters, then as now often Hispanic immigrants.
And it emphasized that "in any event" the legislation would leave the
woman "free for the development of mind and body for wifehood and
motherhood," thereby insuring the "increased intelligence and strengthen-
ing of the race." Justice Charles Evans Hughes' opinion for the Court, to
his credit, did not explicitly endorse these nativist rationales; but he did
hold that it was reasonable for the legislature to proceed "step by step" on
women's working conditions, a ruling that says much about what the
Court was prepared to find reasonable.125
The limited scope of the prevailing justifications for aiding women was
further dramatized in another 1915 case, Mackenzie v. Hare."' Califor-
nia's progressive solicitude for women had extended to granting them the
vote. But in 1907, Congress had clarified the ambiguity in the 1855 natu-
ralization act by requiring American women who married aliens to take
the nationality of their husbands. A California woman who married a
British subject protested the consequent loss of her citizenship and
franchise. But Justice Joseph McKenna, writing for the Court, upheld
the law, indicating that the "identity of husband and wife," with domi-
nance to the husband," was "an ancient principle of our jurisprudence"
that often worked "for her protection." He argued, moreover, that since
her marriage was voluntary, the loss of citizenship had been the woman's
own decision. And while McKenna expressed "sympathy" for the Hob-
son's choice thus forced upon her, he indicated rather vaguely that the law
might assist the nation in conducting foreign affairs. Clearly, to the Court
the subordination of the woman's citizenship to her husband's still re-
quired no weighty justification.
During the second decade of the twentieth century a more radical femi-
nism, partly inspired by the British suffragettes, finally began again to
stress full female equality and to push for the vote more militantly. Its
organizational voices were first the Congressional Union and then the
Woman's Party, led by Alice Paul. Simultaneously, under the influence of
(1914).
125. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 377-78, 384 (1915). The Court also found it permissible for
California to exempt graduate nurses from the law in Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915).
Judith Baer argues persuasively that the law in Bosley may have been more restrictive than protective
in the case of at least one plaintiff, a female pharmacist who feared that California's hours legislation
would result in the loss of her job. J. Baer, supra note 116, at 71.
126. 239 U.S. 229 (1915).
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the progressives, and the realization that they could win immigrant votes,
the NAWSA took a somewhat less nativist and anti-labor line. Even more
conservative women came to recognize that a state-by-state approach to
suffrage was unworkable, and that many male defenders of "states'
rights" were quite willing to use the federal government against the states
on behalf of other causes, such as prohibition. Their male "allies" were
thus shown to be committed to a traditional Americanist social order of
"home, Bible, and Anglo-Saxon civilization" more than genuinely repub-
lican self-government. Many were southerners who still feared the female
vote would threaten rather than reinforce the suppression of blacks. But
while women consequently began working for the suffrage at the national
level with renewed vigor and unity, the "domestic" or "social feminist"
orientation of the mainstream movement was not affected by these
changes, becoming if anything more pronounced. 1 7
I. The Twenties
It was therefore the perspective of women's special domestic and mater-
nal qualities and needs that at last succeeded in winning the vote via the
Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. It was also this perspective that would
long continue to govern how the courts interpreted not only that Amend-
ment but woman's general place in the American constitutional order. In-
deed, the chief case upholding the constitutionality of the Amendment,
Leser v. Garnett12 in 1921, produced a ringing endorsement not of fe-
male equality but of nationalism against the increasingly archaic republi-
can claim of states' rights. Those attacking the measure claimed that, for
those states who did not ratify it, the amendment violated the sovereign
right of "self-preservation" of their distinctive "political communities,"
and that some state legislatures had ratified it in violation of specific bans
on such actions in their state constitutions. Brandeis, now a justice, wrote
for the Court holding that, at least since the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, it had been clear that the nation as a whole could by amend-
ment bind even a dissenting part, and that ratification was a federal func-
tion, in which legislatures could not be constrained in advance by the peo-
ple of their states. 2' This dismissal of state autonomy (and state
electorates) could support federal invalidation of discriminatory state legis-
lation; but it could do so only if that legislation were considered improper,
and as yet no justices took this view of legislation that denied female
equality. Indeed, while intensive activity continued, women's politics be-
came fragmented once again after the passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
127. E. Flexner, supra note 35, at 274-323; A.S. Kraditor, supra note 36, at 208-09, 231-48; D.
Morgan, supra note 93, at 96-101, 150-03; N.F. Cott, supra note 115, at 25-27, 53-81; W. O'Neill,
supra note 74, at 127-29, 201-03.
128. 258 U.S. 130 (1921).
129. Id. at 135; see C. Degler, supra note 35, at 359.
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ment. The NAWSA spawned the non-partisan National League of
Women Voters, but its membership was only about five percent of its
predecessor's. Many women turned instead to partisan women's groups,
or to other, more apolitical civic associations. Moreover, both the con-
servative and the progressive elements that had long supported protective
legislation for women repudiated the National Woman's Party's advocacy
of the Equal Rights Amendment, which promised to render such protec-
tion unconstitutional. The NWP's membership was thus reduced to less
than 200, from a height of 50,000. More mainstream women's organiza-
tions, however, lacked any single alternative agenda. And while many
women in the 1920s continued to participate in voluntarist social reform
groups, many others turned to personal sexual liberation and self-fulfill-
ment, without challenging views of women's special feminine qualities
and (ultimately) domestic role. Again, new scientific "advances," includ-
ing "sciences" of homemaking and motherhood, medical research into
women's biology, and psychological portraits of the "passive" feminine
psyche, all provided additional reinforcement for these adaptations of
traditional notions. As Nancy Cott has observed, whatever their other lim-
itations, these various perspectives promised to preserve gender roles inte-
gral to many women's identities; while the "equal rights promised by the
NWP-especially as negatively presented by trade unionists and other de-
fenders of sex-based legislation-appeared to subvert those roles without
providing secure alternatives."' "
Conservative and progressive fears of full equality were, moreover, re-
inforced by the Supreme Court's employment of egalitarianism as part of
its renewed efforts in the less reformist 1920s to combat economic regula-
tory legislation. The Court's new attitude was announced in Adkins v.
Children's Hospital,' which considered the constitutionality of a mini-
mum wage law for women. Justice George Sutherland's opinion for the
Court overturned the law while attempting to distinguish it from the
hours legislation upheld since Muller. The changes in women's legal, po-
litical, and civil status culminating in the Nineteenth Amendment, Suther-
land contended, had brought the non-physical differences between men
and women almost "to the vanishing point." As a result, special legisla-
tion could be justified only where physical differences were relevant.
Since women's physical vulnerability meant they would suffer hardship
even if they successfully bargained for the same hours as men, the Muller
law was constitutional; but in Sutherland's view, no special frailties justi-
130. B. Harris, supra note 17, at 117-18, 133-35; C. Degler, supra note 35, at 360-61, 402-03,
437; A. Sachs & J.H. Wilson, supra note 37, at 117-18; A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 206-12,
226-30; N.F. Cott, supra note 115, at 41-88, 123-29, 141, 152-74; W. O'Neill, supra note 74, at
258-337; B. Ehrenreich & D. English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of Experts' Advice to Women
91-203 (1979).'
131. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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fled state assistance to obtain wages better than those women could attain
via their own negotiations. He thus tacitly rejected Brewer's belief, ex-
pressed in Muller, that women were by "disposition" incapable of bar-
gaining effectively. Sutherland also observed that the law prevented
women from negotiating lower wages even with female employers, and
that in a companion case, Adkins v. Lyons," 2 the law was being attacked
by a woman who claimed it worked to deny her employment.1"' Chief
Justice William Howard Taft, in dissent, refused to read the Nineteenth
Amendment as resting on so rigidly egalitarian a philosophy. He thought
it was aimed only at insuring that legislation "for their protection will be
in accord with their interests as they see them."1"' And Justice Holmes
sniffed that it would take "more than the Nineteenth Amendment to con-
vince me that there are no differences between men and women," al-
though he did not specify what the relevant differences were."
Adkins is thus a case full of ironies. Later cases were to show that, like
its forerunner Justice Field, the Adkins majority was not really any more
prepared than the dissenters to challenge woman's traditional domestic
place. Yet while Taft was probably right about the philosophy of the
Nineteenth Amendment's ratifiers, Sutherland was genuinely more liberal
and egalitarian in his claim that protective legislation could be demeaning
and restrictive. Alice Paul's National Woman's Party accordingly hailed
the decision. Sutherland's Sumnerian liberalism, however, remained stead-
fastly blind to the fact that, despite their formal legal equality, working
men and women negotiated under economic conditions that often rendered
them incapable of pressing for minimally decent treatment, and that
women did face special obstacles in entering many forms of employment
and in claiming equal pay. Thus his effort to distinguish hours legislation
from wage legislation on the ground that women would suffer even if they
won equal hours not only ignored the fact that any alleged physical frail-
ties would exacerbate the hardship of surviving on the low wages in-
volved. It also paid no attention to the fact that the sort of social and
institutional traditions the dissenters endorsed would make it difficult for
women of equal bargaining skill to win the same employment opportuni-
ties and benefits as men. 36
Whereas the "progressive" Holmes' insistence that women were
ineradicably different perpetuated separate-spheres ideology, Sutherland's
refusal to recognize the entrenched consequences of that ideology, in the
form of women's quite different social circumstances, perpetuated the sep-
132. 261 U.S. 542 (1923)
133. Id. at 553.
134. Id. at 567.
135. Id, at 569-70.
136. C. Degler, supra note 35, at 403, 424-38; A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 197-98; N.F.
Cott, supra note 115, at 136; J. Baer, supra note 116, at 94-95; L. Goldstein, The Constitutional
Rights of Women 25 (2d ed. 1988).
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arate spheres reality. Admittedly, in Sutherland's case this refusal arose
not so much from lack of reflection on liberalism's significance for
women's rights, as from his insistence on a narrow economic definition of
those rights and a relentlessly social Darwinist perspective on social is-
sues. And, as noted, it is also true that the feasibility of some progressive
legislation was quite debatable. However, the liberal tradition's longstand-
ing failure to explore the social implications of its basic principles, to de-
fine "secure alternatives" to traditional gender roles, also played a part.
Without this failing, it is less likely that social Darwinist views could still
have been advanced dogmatically enough to dismiss competing views as
lacking even minimal rationality, as Sutherland (like Peckham in Loch-
ner) did.
In the next few years, the Court routinely confirmed the unconstitu-
tionality of wage legislation for women. And in one other respect, egalita-
rian sentiments won some legal expression in the early 1920s. The
Women's Joint Congressional Committee, a lobbying group formed by
most of the leading women's organizations, persuaded Congress to pass
the Cable Act of 1922, which partly undercut the patriarchal principle
that a woman's citizenship automatically followed that of her husband.
Like Adkins, however, this egalitarian victory was far from untainted.
The WJCC's success came largely because a nativistic Congress wished to
prevent alien women from gaining citizenship simply by marrying Ameri-
can men. The act therefore required their separate naturalization. It also
voided automatic loss of citizenship for native-born American women who
married alien men. Women who had done so after the 1907 act made such
loss of citizenship explicit were eligible for renaturalization, provided they
had not resided for two years in their husband's native country or for five
years outside the United States. Most harshly, American women who
married aliens who were "ineligible by race for naturalization" still did
forfeit their citizenship. Congress repealed that racist provision in the
1930-31 legislative session, but its existence confirms how limited the na-
tion's commitments to human equality remained in this era.13 7
Unsurprisingly, then, the same judges who opposed wage legislation
still upheld protective laws governing women's working hours on tradi-
tional paternalist grounds. In Radice v. New York' 8" in 1923, Sutherland
again wrote for the Court to sustain a law prohibiting employment of
women in restaurants between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. He held that in view of
woman's "more delicate organism," the state restriction was reasonable.
The evidence suggested, however, that many. women found night work
convenient, and that this law was much more restrictive than protective.
137. For wage legislation cases, see Murphy v. Sarrell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); Donham v. West-
Nelson Manufacturing Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1926). On the Cable Act, see V. Sapiro, supra note 36;
N.F. Cott, supra note 115, at 97-99.
138. 264 U.S. 292 (1923).
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Overall, this expression of traditional paternalism was more characteristic
of the judiciary's treatment of women's rights in the 1920s than Suther-
land's egalitarian views of their bargaining powers. Most courts, for ex-
ample, continued to interpret the now-longstanding Married Women's
Property Acts very narrowly, altering as little as possible the inherited
common law views of husband's prerogatives over their wives' labor and
income.139
J. The New Deal
With the arrival of the Depression and the New Deal, however, both
the states and the nation began to pass new labor and social welfare legis-
lation, despite this history of judicial opposition. The adjudication of these
measures eventually produced fundamental changes in many constitu-
tional doctrines, most famously the Court's new openness to all economic
regulatory legislation. However, it did not alter the Court's commitment
to separate spheres ideology. The opportunity was present, because while
progressive forces again brought protective legislation for women before
the Court, their arguments for it went somewhat beyond the standard in-
vocations of female frailty. In the 1936 case of Morehead v. New York ex
rel. Tipaldo," I defenders of a state law setting a minimum wage for
women (and minors) argued that in "modern society," changes "affecting
the economic status of the family" had made it necessary for many wives
to work. But women were unequal in bargaining ability, as well as espe-
cially vulnerable physically. Those bargaining inequalities, they con-
tended, stemmed from several sources: the types of jobs available to
women, such as hotel and restaurant work, suffered "sharp seasonal
movements," but due to "family ties" women were "less mobile"; they
lacked trade unions; and due to "tradition" they were poorly informed
about the labor market and ill-equipped to deal with "unconscionable
employers."
In these arguments there was more explicit recognition of the familial,
economic, and social barriers to equal opportunities for women, and some-
what less suggestion of inherent dependence, even if the narrow range of
employments available to women seemed to be taken as a matter of
course. The opponents of the law said, predictably, that it rested on a
139. Id.; cf. A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 189-90; N.F. Cott, supra note 115, at 185-87;
J. Baer, supra note 116, at 86-87. Anti-protectionist attitudes did surface in a later pair of cases,
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), and United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931);
but there the Court was really driven by an Americanist opposition to political radicalism. In each
case the Court upheld a denial of naturalization to women who indicated conscientious scruples about
forcible national defense, even though they would be ineligible for military service. Schwimmer, the
woman in the first case, was an active and effective agitator for pacifism, among other causes, and in
keeping with the era's restrictive approach to speech, the Court held that this advocacy tended to harm
national interests in ways that merited the denial of citizenship. 279 U.S. at 652.
140. 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
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"social philosophy in conflict with the fundamental principles of the
American Constitution," specified by appeal to Adam Smith and the ina-
lienable property rights "endowed by the Creator."' 14 1 Their brief insisted,
like Sutherland, that the difference in bargaining power, unlike physical
differences, was "illusory" and that women could "organize the same as
men." The National Woman's Party also filed a brief in opposition to the
law.
Justice Pierce Butler wrote for the Court, and overturned the law on
rather extraordinary, narrow grounds. He did not affirm the wisdom of
the Adkins precedent for striking down such laws. Instead, he noted that
the challengers to the New York law had not asked that Adkins be over-
ruled. They had only claimed it was distinguishable from the case at
hand. Butler instead thought Adkins indistinguishable; and since he con-
tended the Court had not been asked to reconsider it, he claimed to be
bound to follow its result and strike down New York's measure as well.1" 2
Justice Harlan F. Stone issued a dissent, joined by Brandeis and Benja-
min Cardozo, rejecting the idea that the Court should not reconsider Ad-
kins simply because it had not been explicitly asked to do so. More impor-
tantly, Stone's opinion placed liberal egalitarianism on the side of
progressive legislation for the first time in these cases. He argued not only
that Adkins should be overruled, but that all such protective economic
regulation should be upheld. Stone did not rely on any "special status" of
women. Instead, he thought the state's police powers included authority to
enact measures for the benefit of workers generally."" Chief Justice
Hughes, however, also wrote a dissent, joined by Stone, Brandeis and
Cardozo, that remained squarely in the "domestic feminist" tradition.
Hughes argued that the "distinctive nature and function of women-their
particular relation to the social welfare-has put them in a separate
class," and that neither the due process nor the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment had taken away the "protective power" over
them that states consequently possessed."' Hence, while the brief in the
case suggested arguments for protection that were less wedded to the ide-
ology of inherently separate spheres, and while one dissent moved towards
a more egalitarian welfare-oriented liberalism, the broadest support for
the measure still was won by a "domestic feminist" protectionist ideology.
When at last the Supreme Court laid to rest the practice of striking
down laws as violations of "liberty of contract" and other forms of eco-
nomic substantive due process in its famed 1937 turnaround, it was
Hughes who wrote for the Court. In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,1 4" he
141. Id. at 597.
142. Id. at 604.
143. Id. at 631-45.
144. Id. at 629.
145. 300 U.S. 379, 391-95, 411-12 (1937).
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sustained a Washington state law establishing a minimum wage for
women, citing Muller and Quong Wing in support of the propriety of
recognizing women's special needs. He did recall the arguments from the
Morehead brief concerning the "relatively weak" bargaining power of
women, especially when dealing with "unconscionable employers." More-
over, the case quickly came to stand for the permissibility of protective
legislation for both sexes. But Hughes' account of women's weak position
said little about the socially institutionalized obstacles to their efforts to
achieve equality. Instead, it bespoke more the sort of view of women's
natural inability to deal with unscrupulous men suggested by his
Morehead dissent. Sutherland, now in dissent himself, repeated his view
that women had gained "legal and political equality with men," so that
there was no "substance" to any "suggestion that the bargaining ability of
the average woman is not equal to that of the average man. . . . The
ability to make a fair bargain, as everyone knows, does not depend upon
sex." By failing to argue clearly that the need for protective legislation
stemmed not from female ineptitude but from her social and economic
position, Hughes continued to place his liberalism on welfare issues on the
side of perspectives that denied the intrinsic equality Sutherland professed.
The upshot of Hughes' position was that, despite its sanctioning of the
more egalitarian modern liberal welfare state, American constitutional
law continued to permit legislation premised on the general confinement
of women to the domestic sphere. A startlingly emphatic example came
later the same year in Breedlove v. Suttles."' Georgia required all inhab-
itants between the ages of 21 and 60 to pay a poll tax, except for the blind
and women who did not register to vote. The law obviously rewarded
women for not voting and gave husbands an incentive to discourage their
wives' political interests. But Justice Butler, writing for a unanimous
Court, sustained the law through appeal to Americanist, separate-sphere,
and republican arguments. Women, he said, could be exempted from the
tax "on the basis of special considerations to which they are naturally
entitled. In view of burdens necessarily borne by them for the preservation
of the race, the State reasonably" could decide the tax was too much of an
additional burden. Butler left unclear just how the tax made racial preser-
vation more difficult. He may well have had in mind the "burdens" of
political causes that women might have pursued more readily in the ab-
sence of the law. At any rate, Butler's willingness to uphold denials of any
public role to women was readily apparent in his further observation that
the "laws of Georgia declare the husband to be the head of the family and
the wife to be subject to him," so that a tax on women would improperly
"add to his burden." Similarly, the income from the tax was to be used
for educational purposes, and in Georgia (contrary to even the most mini-
146. 302 U.S. 277 (1937).
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mally liberal separate-spheres ideology) it was "the father's duty to pro-
vide for education of the children." As one might expect, Butler buttressed
his deference to these near-feudal state practices by invoking the extensive
state power over the suffrage that remained despite the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments. In a truly remarkable denial of the law's real
effect, he also exculpated it from any charge that it discriminated against
the right of men to vote on account of their sex!
While this opinion was no doubt more traditionalist than were the New
Deal justices as a whole, their support for its result indicates that they had
little trouble with legislation designed to "protect" women for their do-
mestic functions, even if this "protection" meant inhibiting their access to
public affairs. Indeed, while the New Dealers did establish national eco-
nomic regulations that benefited all workers, including women, they made
no serious efforts to alter the special restrictions and lower pay working
women suffered, conditions male-dominated labor unions continued to
support. So long as such protectionism was considered permissible, it
could easily be merged with the most patriarchal Americanist views of
women's place, as Butler's opinion dramatically demonstrated. The rem-
nant of the republican states' rights tradition also continued to justify def-
erence to such restrictive state actions. Thus despite the passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment and the triumph of New Deal liberalism over the
nineteenth century laissez-faire views of Sutherland, a genuinely egalita-
rian liberalism in regard to gender was barely articulated as a constitu-
tional philosophy in this period.1,4 7
This survey also indicates that the arguments that did prevail appealed
again and again to the need to preserve the sorts of social roles consistent
with maintaining republican institutions and a suitable republican citi-
zenry, and to America's cultural traditions, customs, and sacred way of
life, taken to define the proper place of women. Even when women were
held able to make a special contribution as participating republican citi-
zens, this role was still viewed only as an extension, not a relinquishing or
sharing, of their natural functions in the domestic sphere. The success of
these views strongly indicates that the members of America's titularly lib-
eral society felt it important to define fairly specifically the nature of their
political community and the social arrangements it involved. This record
supports the suggestion that when Americans felt impelled to do so, early
liberalism's failure to consider in any full way the social and civic forms
that would best realize its principles meant that they turned to alternative
notions in their political culture. The most extensive legal elaborations of
liberal equality's social implications came late and drew on the Darwinist
sociology of Spencer and Sumner to support the laissez-faire (and other-
wise Americanist) jurisprudence of Field and Sutherland. This harsh and
147. A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 262-70.
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one-sided view of liberalism's commitment to equal rights was of little use
either in supporting an inclusive yet reassuring sense of community, or in
aiding those oppressed under existing social forms.
IV. EPILOGUE: THE CONTINUING DILEMMAS OF LIBERAL
EGALITARIANISM
Matters have changed in recent decades, and so it is natural to question
whether the problems revealed by this record are still pertinent. In an
essay devoted to providing the historical perspective needed for such in-
quiries, I can only sketch the ways I believe they are. Despite the rela-
tively unchanged status of women, the New Deal and World War II did
deal severe blows to the republican and Americanist traditions while
bringing to power a modern liberalism quite different from that of the
Lochner Court or the nation's founding. First the Depression made it
clear that the economy had become nationally interdependent and that
prosperity could not be achieved through disparate regulation by many
state governments, or through no regulation at all. Then World War II
required a national mobilization for a world role that the United States
has yet to relinquish. As just noted, the Supreme Court responded to these
developments by sanctioning broad national economic and military powers
that reduced the states to transparently subsidiary roles in most pressing
governmental concerns. The nation's opposition to the racist totalitarian
regimes of Europe also led to some discrediting of the more nativistic
strains of Americanism in mainstream thought, as well as to intellectual
repudiation of the sciences' sanctioning of racism-although the Cold War
atmosphere fueled McCarthyism's political repressions aimed at "un-
American" activities.
In place of the property-oriented natural rights liberalism of the turn of
the century, federal lawmakers increasingly came to adopt the more ex-
perimental and utilitarian views of their progressive pragmatist oppo-
nents, which permitted the national government to take virtually any ac-
tion the people thought necessary to promote the general welfare, whether
or not this was consistent with some economic or social "natural order of
things." On this view, everyone's interests were to be counted equally,
with majority rule prevailing-a position that did not guarantee correction
of established inequalities, but that did present them as matters of political
choice. Thus, despite the failure of New Deal thought and legislation to
move the Court away from protectionism toward egalitarian feminism, the
new constitutional perspectives did provide grounds to reject the sanctifica-
tion of traditional arrangements that had for so long served to deny female
aspirations.148
148. C. Degler, supra note 35, at 438-40; R.G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 174-
92 (1960); W.E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 336-48 (1963); R.M.
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In the postwar era, moreover, the new sense of human equality aroused
in part by the experience of military service against European tyrannies
fed a revived civil rights movement for blacks. Those efforts, and women's
own ongoing attempts to expand their economic opportunities, helped in
turn to inspire a new and more egalitarian women's movement. Cam-
paigns for the rights of other minorities and the poor followed. These
movements added to the prevailing utilitarian social philosophy a stronger
insistence on realizing equal concern and respect for all persons.
I have suggested elsewhere that this insistence reflected the increased
acceptance, among policy-makers at least, of a further ideal of American
identity, which may be termed "democratic cultural pluralism." This
ideal carries on the cosmopolitanism, tolerance, and respect for human
liberties of the classical liberal tradition, but it is built on the progressive
pragmatists' rejection of individualism and natural law in favor of an em-
phasis on socially constituted identities and memberships, consensual truth
standards and hence considerable cultural relativism. One of its chief theo-
rists, philosopher Horace Kallen, argued that these precepts pointed to
national policies that would respect and indeed promote cultural plural-
ism, out of deference to persons' constitutive attachments to distinctive eth-
nic, religious, and cultural groups. He therefore envisioned America as a
"democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously
through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through
the perfection of men according to their kind." According to this plural-
ism, all groups and persons deserved equal opportunities to pursue their
own destinies, so the nation's history of legal ethnic, racial and gender
discriminations was unacceptable. In contrast, national economic actions
to promote opportunities for all were perfectly permissible. But even in
the cause of prosperity, there should be no effort to transform equality
into uniformity, to insist that all fit into a standard "Americanized"
mold. 49
As those points suggest, democratic pluralist ideals had some potential
to stress the distinctive qualities of women, as of other groups; but their
focus on human equality in terms of basic rights was even more plain. In
the 1950s, women's rights found some champions who parallelled the odd
alliance of George Sutherland and Alice Paul. While organized labor,
moderate women's associations, and the Women's Bureau in the Depart-
Smith, Liberalism and American Constitutional Law 154-60 (1985); J.T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain
Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought 361-415 (1986).
149. J.T. Kloppenberg, supra note 148, at 64-100, 145-95; R.M. Smith, supra note 1, at 245-47;
R.M. Smith, The Irony of Liberal Citizenship in America, paper presented to the Claremont Insti-
tute's 4th Annual Novus Ordo Seclorum Bicentennial Conference (1987); J. Higham, supra note 35,
at 59-60, 220; A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 304-15; H. Kallen, Culture and Democracy in the
United States 124 (1924); M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life 14, 57 (1964); Gleason, Ameri-
can Identity and Americanization, in Concepts of Ethnicity 119-211 (W. Peterson, M. Novak, & P.
Gleason, 1980); Keely, Immigration and the American Future, in Ethnic Relations in America 29-31
(L. Liebman ed. 1982).
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ment of Labor continued to view the ERA as a threat to necessary protec-
tive legislation, Eisenhower Republicans found it politically useful to give
the amendment rhetorical support. As the civil rights movement gave the
ideal of democratic pluralism political potency, Democrats began to follow
suit in the 1960s."50 Both racial- and gender-based egalitarian claims then
finally found important modern expression in American national legisla-
tion via the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which explicitly covered women as
well as blacks, however inadvertently: women were added on the motion
of Virginia Senator Howard Smith, who was trying to diminish support
for the act. Then Senator Margaret Chase Smith and Representative
Martha Griffiths fought to keep them included. Democratic cultural plu-
ralist ideas were also enacted in a wide range of other measures, including
the liberalizing 1965 Immigration and Naturalization Act; the 1965 Vot-
ing Rights Act; the 1968 Bilingual Education Act and the spread of bilin-
gual ballots and governmental publications; more pluralist educational
curricula; and many other steps aimed at assisting traditional victims of
civic discriminations. Partly in justification of these initiatives, cultural
pluralism became the leading ideal of community membership and citizen-
ship in the mainstream academic liberal theories of the 1970s. For a time,
some observers believed the country's new embrace of a national govern-
ment acting vigorously to realize not only economic prosperity but also
equal citizenship for all would at last lead to the development of a genu-
inely unified American civic community-a community in which women,
too, would be full members. " '
In this climate two important constitutional innovations for women's
rights gained prominence. First, Congress finally endorsed the ERA in
1972; the longstanding opposition of pro-labor House Judiciary Commit-
tee Chairman Emanuel Celler was overcome by pressures from the
women's movement, Congresswoman Edith Green's hearings on gender
discrimination, and Congresswoman Martha Griffiths' forceful political
leadership.1 5
2
150. In 1954, under Eisenhower, the Women's Bureau ceased to oppose the ERA but did not
endorse it. A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 306. The activist Warren Court also remained inegal-
itarian on gender. Ruling in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) on a state law that prevented
women from serving on juries unless they requested to do so in person at court, the Court said that
despite her "entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men,
woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." States could adopt measures excluding
a woman from public life unless "she herself" found such service to be "consistent with her own
special responsibilities."
151. A. Kessler-Harris, supra note 91, at 312-15; Keely, supra note 149, at 30-31; Beer, Liber-
alism and the National Idea, 5 Pub. Interest 70, 71-82 (1966); Black, The Unfinished Business of
the Warren Court, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 3, 8-12, 44 (1970); J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 442-50, 523-
29 (1971); B.A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 82-83, 194-96, 347, 375 (1980); M.
Gordon, Models of Pluralism, 454 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 178 (1981); G.Y. Steiner,
Constitutional Inequality: The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment 10-13 (1985).
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Second, the Supreme Court began to strike down some laws injurious to
women as violations of the equal protection and due process clauses, with
some justices suggesting that, even absent the ERA, gender classifications
were as constitutionally "suspect" as racial classifications. The Supreme
Court came closest to treating women as full claimants to modern plural-
istic liberal egalitarianism in the 1973 case of Frontiero v. Richardson."
There, Justice Brennan, writing for three other justices, indicated that
gender distinctions were indeed "suspect," requiring compelling govern-
mental justifications for their use. His opinion perceptively characterized
and repudiated the "romantic paternalism" of the traditionalist American
separate spheres ideology underlying so much "protective" legislation,
which Brennan said often placed women "not on a pedestal but in a
cage."'" That same year, the Court also handed down the landmark deci-
sion in Roe v. Wade, 5 5 indicating that women were entitled to make fun-
damental life decisions for themselves, including the choice whether or not
to bear a child, subject to certain sharply limited state regulatory powers.
Collectively, these developments seemed to promise that the nation's his-
torical denials to women of the personal liberty and equality classical lib-
eralism asserted for all might at last be coming to a close.
Yet while the 1973 decisions set in motion lines of doctrinal innovation
that in some important respects are likely to endure, in retrospect the
early 1970s may have been the high water mark of this modern liberal
egalitarian tide, at least for the foreseeable future. To be sure, the Court
went on to extend the Roe ruling against many other state attempts to
direct sexual activity and childbearing; but it permitted Congress to curb
public funds for the medical costs of abortions. In addition, the support for
Roe in recent cases has been only 5 to 4.1'6 At this writing many scholars
and journalists project its reversal. The Court as a whole, moreover, never
endorsed strict scrutiny for gender classifications. Since Craig v. Boren'
in 1976, the Court has instead adopted the slippery middle-ground ap-
proach of "intermediate scrutiny," requiring classifications that discrimi-
nate against either sex to be shown to be "substantially related" to an
"important" governmental interest. Undeniably, this standard has proved
sufficient to support the greatest egalitarian activism on gender issues in
the Court's not-so-distinguished history in this area. Discriminatory mar-
riage laws, pension schemes, and other restrictive or paternalistic mea-
sures have been struck down, while affirmative action systems have been
153. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
154. Id. at 682, 684, 688.
155. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
156. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Thornburgh v. ACOG, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
157. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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upheld.1"8 It is legitimately debatable, moreover, whether the justices are
entitled to go further, given the failure of principles of sexual equality to
win any clear constitutional embodiment. Again, women were consciously
denied mention in the postwar amendments, and the Nineteenth Amend-
ment is traceable largely to the power of more conservative "domestic fem-
inist" views. Nonetheless, recent cases have so thoroughly displaced the
demanding standard of Frontiero that no justice is currently advocating a
strict scrutiny approach.
Contemporary with these cases was, of course, the failure of the cam-
paign to ratify the ERA, which would almost certainly have required
strict scrutiny for gender classifications. After thirty states ratified the pro-
posed amendment in 1972 and 1973, organized opposition arose, led in
part by women. As Jane Mansbridge depicts the coalition that effectively
countered the ratification effort, it is recognizable as much the same sort
of alliance, driven by much the same sort of fears, that so often produced
legal support for traditional ethnocultural conceptions of American iden-
tity in the historical record just reviewed. Mansbridge describes it as a
"New Right" coalition of "the traditional Radical Right, religious activ-
ists, and that . . . segment of the noncosmopolitan working and middle
classes that was deeply disturbed by the cultural changes-especially the
changes in sexual mores-in the second half of the twentieth century."
This coalition pitted "fundamentalists and heavy churchgoers against
agnostics and Jews, people with many children against those with none,
old people against young, country against city dwellers, and nationwide,
southerners against people on the East and West Coasts." ERA critics
like Phyllis Schlafly succeeded in portraying the amendment as anti-
family, anti-child, anti-traditional morality, and pro-abortion, pro-gays,
pro-unisex lifestyles, pro-combat for women. As so often in the past, the
fears these images raised about the survival of social roles and identities
many found reassuring proved too great to overcome. And, as Mansbridge
also notes, the anxious, defensively self-assertive political forces that de-
feated the ERA played major parts in the politics of the seventies and
eighties on many other issues as well. 5
When support for the ERA flagged, the Supreme Court began to apply
its "intermediate scrutiny" test in less demanding ways, and it remains
unclear how far President Reagan's promotion of William Rehnquist to
Chief Justice and addition of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin
Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy to the highest bench will change matters.
Rehnquist dissented in Craig v. Boren, and he argued during the late
158. Id. at 197; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins.,
446 U.S. 142 (1980); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
159. C. Degler, supra note 35, at 436, 446-50; J.J. Mansbridge, supra note 152, at 15-16 &
passim; cf. G.Y. Steiner, supra note 151, at 46-49.
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1970s that men needed no special solicitude and that gender classifications
affecting them adversely should receive only minimal scrutiny. He ignored
the manner in which discriminations that apparently aided women mate-
rially often in fact operated to reinforce traditional gender roles (as in the
case of death benefit laws that make it easier for men than women to
support their survivors, thereby discouraging women from serving as chief
wage-earners).160
Rehnquist subsequently accepted the propriety of the Craig v. Boren
intermediate standard for all types of gender discrimination, but in apply-
ing it he remains insensitive to the repressive effects of many "protective"
measures. Thus in 1981 he wrote for a plurality sustaining a California
law that made men alone liable for sexual intercourse involving one or
more minors. The gender discrimination seemed less concerned with the
professed goal of discouraging teen pregnancies than with ratifying tradi-
tional views tracing adolescent sexual activity to male corruption of inno-
cent females. 61 The same year in Rostker v. Goldberg,6  Rehnquist
wrote for the Court sustaining a male-only draft registration program
even though the gender distinction appeared to hamper more than to assist
the goverment's goal of assessing the human resources available for na-
tional emergencies.
Among the Reagan appointees, Sandra Day O'Connor, at least, is
likely to remain sensitive to the invidious gender stereotyping that legisla-
tion defended on other grounds may really express. She wrote for a 5-4
Court (with her law school classmate Rehnquist in dissent) in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan,"' finding a women-only state nursing
school to violate equal protection. Her opinion deemed the school unneces-
sary as an aid to women, who dominate the state's nursing profession, and
likely to reinforce views of nursing as a "women's career." But that mar-
gin was as thin as the one now barely surviving in the abortion area; and
while no subsequent cases have indicated any significant changes, it re-
mains quite possible that the Supreme Court's approach to gender issues
will become more expressive of Chief Justice Rehnquist's views than
O'Connor's or Brennan's.
The defeat of the ERA, and the concomitant threats to the Court's
more egalitarian modern stance in gender cases, form part of a more gen-
eral reaction against the democratic pluralist initiatives that reshaped
American citizenship laws from the mid-fifties through the early seventies.
Desegregation via busing and affirmative action programs have produced
mounting acrimony. The return to more open immigration since 1965 has
160. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217, 220-21 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224-
42 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 321 (1977).
161. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
162. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
163. 458 U.S. 718, 727-30 (1982).
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led to a new influx of Asian and, especially, Spanish-speaking immi-
grants, heavily concentrated in a few regions, provoking new disputes over
bilingualism, immigration and refugee policies, welfare, health care, am-
nesty for illegal aliens and education for their children, and other related
issues. It has produced ugly new displays of ethnic bigotry as well, from
crowded inner cities to competitive elite colleges.
Modern egalitarian initiatives are now often criticized for failing to
promote either genuine equality or community at either the national or
local levels. The enterprise of national governance they shaped is routinely
portrayed as a process of "interest group" or "corporate pluralist" liber-
alism, in which selfish special interests, ethnic, economic, regional, reli-
gious, all compete for shares of the nation's largesse, with no broader
common purposes underlying their bickering and bargaining. Samuel
Beer, a former Great Society enthusiast, found its consequences in 1978 to
be "a fragmentation of the national community" into competing "con-
sumer" and "cultural groups" that did not "form a public" and shared
only "negativism." John Higham concluded that the greater problem had
become not appreciating "diversity" but "rediscovering what values can
bind together" our "kaleidoscopic culture." For many, the answer of the
1980s proved to be the traditional values of the "American way," promi-
nently featured in three consecutive successful Republican presidential
campaigns. 16
It would be egregiously wrong, moreover, to think that the reservations
about liberal egalitarianism, in either its classical or its modern, demo-
cratic pluralist forms, are confined to the "New Right," academic neocon-
servatives, and Reagan Republicans. Many feminists were always con-
cerned that liberal egalitarianism might foster a stress on formal equality
of rights and identical treatment that would fail to address the distinctive
aspects of women's historical experiences, contemporary material situa-
tions, and future aspirations. Liberal "equal treatment" might then fail to
combat, and so help to perpetuate, the burdens and constraints imposed by
past discriminatory attitudes. As the need to unite in support of the ERA
faded, a wide range of challenges surfaced to the "gender neutrality" lib-
eralism was thought to require.
Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan has provided a tremendously in-
fluential empirically based analysis of how women often view morality in
terms of personal relationships and care for particular individuals, in con-
trast to more "liberal" and typically male moral perspectives stressing
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only respect for the abstract rights of faceless "others." Political theorist
Jean Bethke Elshtain has criticized liberal feminism for focusing on crass,
utilitarian self-seeking, justifying attenuated concerns for both family and
civic community. And numerous feminist lawyers have questioned the em-
phasis on sameness they perceive in even activist equal protection theories.
Catharine MacKinnon, among others, has contended that the law's focus
on actual gender differences still relies upon actual but socially con-
structed meanings to perpetuate oppressive statuses. Instead, she argues,
one must see that women are differently situated, in social forms that fre-
quently disempower them and which therefore ought to be transformed.""8
These developments indicate why the questions raised by the nation's
historical civic discriminations remain vital. Many Americans today still
find a body of civic laws aimed at realizing liberal egalitarian principles
unacceptable-some because those principles seem too limited in their
consequences, many more because they are perceived as threatening the
social and cultural order, however hierarchical, which these citizens feel to
be essential to their secure possession of meaningful social identities. And
while established and, often quite privileged citizens usually assert tradi-
tional Americanist values and roles most steadfastly, the opposition of
many women in all classes to the ERA indicates that even the alleged
beneficiaries of change may find it disturbing.
Yet if neither classical liberalism nor contemporary democratic plural-
ism offers conceptions of civic identity that are at once egalitarian enough
and reassuring enough to overcome attachments to repressive but familiar
social forms, each nonetheless has certain great strengths. The historical
record suggests strongly that it has been liberal egalitarian commitments,
whether formulated in terms of natural rights or pragmatic pluralistic tol-
erance, that have served to inspire and defend the most significant civic
reforms in United States history, from the abolition of slavery and the
civil rights movement to the nineteenth and twentieth century women's
movements to efforts to establish and maintain the rights of ethnically di-
verse immigrants and other minorities. Conversely, history suggests Amer-
icans should be extremely wary of proposals to set aside liberal egalitarian
civic ideals in favor of (other) "traditional values" or doctrines stressing
the unique and distinctive character of a gender, race, or ethnocultural
group. Too often those values and doctrines, however benignly offered,
have proven fertile soil in which new callous legal restrictions sprouted. 6 '
As Catharine MacKinnon has argued in reference to Carol Gilligan's
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work, there is a danger that if women place great emphasis on their so-
cially constituted differences from men, when those differences are partly
produced by confining social institutions, when "difference means domi-
nance," then policies that affirm and reinforce those differences may sim-
ply affirm "the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness." One should
say "may," because there is clearly much of value in the moral perspective
Gilligan emphasizes, and it need not have any ineradicable connection
with restrictive laws. Even so, the caution remains that, as Barbara Har-
ris has observed, in American experience every "ideology that has focused
on the difference between the sexes, no matter how it is phrased, has been
used historically to consign women to the home.'
' 6 7
I believe, then, that the contemporary task must be to reformulate the
nation's dedication to human liberty into a public philosophy that can
combat oppressive social structures while addressing more successfully
widespread longings for a sustaining sense of civic identity and a mean-
ingful social order. That task is a daunting one. I think it must begin by
rejecting the view, even more pervasive in contemporary democratic plu-
ralist theories than in classical liberalism, that the liberal state is essen-
tially a neutral umpire for subjectively valued pursuits and diverse views
of the good life. Instead, a liberal polity should be united, not by ethnicity,
religion, language, or particular customs or social roles, but by a shared
political and social purpose: to promote ways of life that advance liberty
for all. This liberty is to be understood, however, not simply as the right
to do whatever one wishes. On this view a free life is guided by esteem
for, and the exercise of, humanity's remarkable capacities for reflective
self-governance, personally and politically. To distinguish this conception
of human freedom from simple willfulness, I have previously termed it
"rational" or "reflective" liberty. 6
To seek to promote capacities for liberty in this sense is not to set up a
neutral ideal. It is to establish a substantive standard for judging social
institutions, according to whether they impair or enhance the human ca-
pacities which this view sees as having intrinsic moral dignity and worth.
It is to seek to empower all citizens; to find public institutions that can
make available to them the cognitive qualities, the material resources, and
the social opportunities they need to pursue the paths they reflectively
choose to value most among their available memberships and obligations,
so long as their choices are not destructive of future capacities for reflec-
tive choices by themselves or others.
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This is a sense of political purpose that preserves classical liberalism's
call for freedom for all, since virtually all human beings except the most
severely mentally deficient either display or have the potential to develop
meaningful capacities for understanding themselves and their social
worlds, and to make deliberative choices. Hence all deserve to have those
capacities publicly respected and assisted, regardless of race, gender, reli-
gion, or other aspects of their ethnocultural identities. At the same time,
taking the promotion of such concrete, actual human abilities and oppor-
tunities as a shared political goal has the effect of turning liberalism away
from the conceptions of atomistic individuals and abstract rights that Gil-
ligan and others rightly decry. It also eliminates the tendency for liberal
thought to identify equality with formally identical treatment, even for
those differently situated, that MacKinnon and others rightly criticize.
The move to this more purposeful liberalism has these consequences
because it calls for citizens to attend to how they and others can meaning-
fully exercise and enhance their potential for reflective choice in the social
contexts in which they find themselves-a question that may lead them to
challenge those contexts. Citizens must reflect on the place of their social
memberships, familial, religious, professional, political, among their val-
ues and aspirations-reflect, that is, on the persons and things they most
care about. Their lives of deliberative freedom must involve giving those
cares appropriate weight in the choices they make. But citizens must also
frequently ask how their various memberships are affecting their capaci-
ties for such informed deliberative self-guidance; for on this view, they
should reform or abandon those pursuits which are destructive of their
self-directive abilities. Particularly when they act as collective deliberative
self-governors, through democratic political processes, such liberal citizens
should ask whether basic economic, educational, and cultural arrange-
ments are working adequately to empower all, or whether some are being
systematically neglected or constrained. When such oppressive political
and social institutions are found, a liberal polity must seek their
reconstruction.
I believe this turn in a more purposeful direction thus has the promise
to add to liberalism's allegedly "masculine" focus on capacities for ra-
tional calculation and respect for the rights of others a "feminine" empha-
sis on persons' needs, desires, and duties to care for others, especially those
with whom they share memberships deeply constitutive of their moral
identities-and to do so without justifying a divisive particularism that
results in lack of concern for those outside one's constitutive groups, or
strongly hierarchical views of what the structure of one's groups should
be. On this view, all people deserve considerable room to work out which
involvements really constitute lives of freedom for them; but all are also
obliged to regard others, inside and outside such involvements, with es-
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teem for their abilities to make morally significant judgments and
commitments.
A liberal polity that shared this sense of purpose as a common endeavor
would better support feelings of meaningful national membership than
classical liberalism or contemporary democratic pluralism has proven able
to do. There can be no better founded source of pride in one's country
than the belief that it aims above all at furthering the capacities for re-
sponsible freedom that give persons moral dignity. If citizens come to feel
more widely that this commitment is what their civic life is really all
about, then many more may be inspired rather than angered or intimi-
dated by political efforts to change social institutions that are stifling the
opportunities of their fellow citizens.
After all, many Americans now affirm proudly their nation's revolu-
tionary opposition to monarchical government and religious intolerance;
its early extension of the franchise to workers and subsequent extension to
women; its abolition of slavery; its modern reforms of racial segregation
and bigoted immigration policies; its great success in generating material
abundance, combined with continual (albeit controversial) efforts to find
ways all can productively share in it. If public institutions expressed this
shared purpose more clearly, desires to feel good about America might be
at least as well satisfied in times of reform and improvement as in times of
unchanging stability. Yet even while the promotion of liberty thus under-
stood could provide a stronger sense of shared worthwhile communal
membership, the content of that goal should militate against imposing un-
due uniformity, against policies that fail to respect the disparate but re-
sponsible choices of others. Women, then, would have the legal and moral
right to choose to be different from men, and each other, or not, as they
wished; but public policies would also try to establish institutions that
gave them meaningful resources for making such choices, through, for ex-
ample, treating child-rearing and jobs as options available to both sexes,
and also seeking ways to enable both to combine them.
To be sure, no moral perspective is likely to reconcile entirely the con-
flicting claims of individuality and group memberships, personal liberty
and shared values, pluralist diversity and harmonious social unity. The
more purposeful liberalism here would explicitly be in tension with many
traditional views, but its precise implications for proper legal treatment of
the sexes are far from self-evident. Here, I have tried to provide not set-
tled answers, but simply some lessons from past experience that indicate
the problems Americans should focus on and, perhaps, particular direc-
tions that we can most promisingly explore. Those lessons make it more
understandable why the liberal egalitarian reform movements which
promised so much for women in the early 1970s have lost considerable
force, for that pattern has occurred before, particularly in the Civil War
and progressive eras. The pattern represents a failure for liberalism's ex-
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plicit principles; and as the resurgent opposition to fully equal female citi-
zenship of the 1980s indicates, this failure is not confined to America's
now-superseded dark past. Perhaps the specific diagnosis of that failure
offered here is incorrect, but in any case I believe it is a failure that
should command considerable attention in the years ahead. For I take the
chief lesson of America's history of discriminatory citizenship laws to be
that longings for a sense of the importance of particular communities and
social roles pose many dangers-but that efforts to ignore such longings
guarantee that those dangers will sooner or later come to pass.
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